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ABSTRACT 
An abstract for the thesis of Stephen Frederick Anderson for the Master 
of Arts in Histoty presented November 4, 1994. 
Title: Establishing US Militaty Government: Law and Order in Southern 
Bavaria 1945. 
In May 1945, United States Militaty Government (MG) 
detachments arrived in assigned areas of Bavaria to launch the 
occupation. By the summer of 1945, the US occupiers became the 
ironical combination of stern victor and watchful master. Absolute 
control gave way to the "direction" of German authority. For this process 
to succeed, MG officials had to establish a stable, clearly defined and 
fundamentally strict environment in which German officials would begin 
to exercise token control. 
The early occupation was a highly unstable stage of chaos, fear 
and confusing objectives. MG detachments and the reconstituted 
German authorities performed complex tasks with many opportunities 
for failure. In this environment, a crucial MG obligation was to help 
secure law and order for the defeated and dependent German populace 
whose previously existing authorities had been removed. Germans 
themselves remained largely peaceful, yet unforeseen actors such as 
liberated "Displaced Persons" rose to menace law and order. The threat of 
criminal disorder and widespread black market activity posed great risks 
in the early occupation. 
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This thesis demonstrates how US MG established its own 
authority in the Munich area in 1945, and how that authority was 
applied and challenged in the realm of criminal law and order. This study 
explores themes not much researched. Thorough description of local 
police reestablishment or characteristic crime issues hardly exists. There 
is no substantial local examination of the relationship between such 
issues and the early establishment of MG authority. Local MG records 
housed in the Bayertsches Hauptstaatsarchiv (Bavarian Main State 
Archives) provide most of the primacy sources. This study also relies 
heavily on German-language secondacy sources. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of this year, four years after the German 
Wiedervereinigung, or unification, the United States symbolically ended 
its significant role in the occupation of Germany at a Berlin ceremony. 
In the same period, however, the US and its current United Nations allies 
find themselves in other foreign lands under chaotic conditions and 
complex political circumstances. In a global juggling act, US forces are 
obligated-- for better or worse-- to restore or establish governments, 
peace or both in Kuwait, Somalia, and Haiti. Even so, some argue, these 
selective commitments are not enough: in still other lands US forces 
could also be restoring "order" but are not-- yet. 
A critical role of US forces these days is not to commit to a long 
series of campaigns of conquest, but rather to reestablish and maintain 
order so that new chances and changes can be created. Recently, it 
appears, American forces have truly become the "world's policemen." 
Securing law and order has become the understood mission of US forces 
wherever US interests are affected. 
For the US Military Government detachments blazing into Bavaria 
on the US Seventh Army's back in May 1945, the immediate objective 
was vety much the same as it for US authorities today. The maintenance 
of order and the establishment of authority were pressing goals, there-
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establishment of a "democratic" form of government the eventual goal. 
The situation in 1945 was also vecy much different. A difficult and 
damaging world war was coming to a close. For years Americans had 
been waging war against a Germany they had learned to despise. With 
the German capitulation of May 1945, however, Americans were suddenly 
forced to administer and care for their bitter foe. On their part, Germans 
had endured and lost a long war at profound and devastating costs to 
their highly developed society. German politics, the economy, honorable 
and infamous institutions alike would be radically altered. National 
psyche, beliefs and traditions would never obey the same impulses as 
before. Whether 1994 or 1945, undertaking the role of occupier or 
assuming that of the occupied involves severe and problematic duties. 
Like its allies in other parts of Germany,1 US Militaty Government 
detachments arriving in a recently overrun area had one principal 
mission: to dictate the vanquished German foe. In May of 1945, US 
authorities arrived in the defeated and debilitated areas of Munich and 
Southern Bavaria and "hit the ground running" to dictate all 
developments and influence evecy initiative. 
1 The British held most of Northern and Northwestern Germany, 
the Russians all of Eastern Germany, and the Americans Southern, 
Central, and parts of Southwest Germany. Free French Forces held areas 
in Southwest Germany. With the establishment of official occupation 
zones in the fall of 1945, France received more of Southwest German 
territoty, including Stuttgart, where US occupation authorities had 
already begun to establish themselves. The US gained the Bremen 
enclave as an outlet to the sea in the north. The Allied zonal agreements 
had many minor effects on the German map in addition to the eventual 
significant split between east and west and elilnination of vast Prussian 
lands. Bavaria, for example, lost the Southern Rhineland territocy it had 
held since the Napoleanic era. 
The early occupation was a direct "extension of war" --by 
preseiVing victocy and consummating military aims. As in wartime, 
extreme conditions demanded that expediency and security determined 
actions. The immediate goals were direct and urgent. The prominent 
political occu patton goals most recognized today were not yet clearly 
formulated, inevitable, or even intended. "Denazification" and 
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"Democratization" were not foremost in the minds of US Army or Military 
Government officers. The Marshall Plan and the creation of a stable, 
economically self-sufficient Germany as a bulwark against the 
Communist Bloc were a long way off. The future course of the occupation 
would be vecy much influenced by the degree to which commanding 
authority could be established. 
Still, the war had indeed ended. US MG2 was directed to modify its 
martial objectives in the same early stage of the occupation. MG could 
not "rule" as victor indefmitely. Complete control promptly gave way to 
··direction." For proper direction to succeed, MG had to frrst set up a 
stable, clearly defined and fundamentally strict relationship in which 
German officials would begin to exercise token au thortty under strict US 
supervision. US occupiers soon became the ironical combination of stem 
victor and custodial ruler. This status required certain responsibilities 
and obligations to the defeated and suddenly dependent German 
populace whose previously eXisting authorities had been removed. 
For both occupier and occupied, the early occupation was a highly 
unstable period full of chaos, fear and confusing objectives. Evecy day, 
2The abbreviation MG (Military Government) will be used 
throughout this study. 
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MG detachments performed a complex juggling act with every 
opportunity for failure. MG officers were forced to choose between three 
different sets of directives. Many times detachment officers feuded with 
each other or collided with tactical army colleagues. Local circumstances 
changed almost daily. Massive redeployment began immediately after the 
capitulation in May and greatly complicated every Military Government 
detachment's ability to pursue a clear local policy. Most local German 
infrastructure was completely destroyed or severely damaged and required 
massive reconstruction simply to get the community "up and running." 
Germans trusted no one and feared repression daily from their American 
occupiers, former forced laborers, concentration camp inmates, and 
revenge-seeking fellow citizens. Germans appointed to posts frequently 
lost their positions in the face of ever more s trtngen t political 
requirements delineated in the denazification directives. "Displaced 
Persons," the various foreign nationals liberated from forced labor or 
concentration camps, required immediate assistance and guidance. MG 
wrestled with all sorts of such dilemmas not only in Southern Bavaria, 
but throughout the US Zone of occupation. The problems were immense, 
and the need to overcome them immediate. Crucial future developments, 
directions and successes were being determined. 
In this environment, the threat of criminal disorder posed great 
risks to US and German authorities. Major breakdowns of law and order 
could severely impede the overall progress and intended aims of the 
occupation. Without the proper level of stability the broad political 
occupation agendas understood and praised today would have been 
doomed to the planning stages much longer than necessary. As things 
turned out, critical criminal issues were controlled just enough to cany 
on -- at times just barely enough. 
A major task of MG and the first reestablished German officials 
was providing "public safety," the control of threatening violent acts as 
well as theft and economic crimes. The challenges were varied and not 
always expected. Germans themselves remained surprisingly peaceful, 
but unforeseen actors rose to menace law and order. Many of the 
lawbreakers had experienced more than six years of brutal oppression 
and warfare. Among them, certain Displaced Persons turned out to be 
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the most violent, persistent and intimidating lawbreakers. Others, such 
as Gls or German housewives became (for drastically different reasons) 
small-scale smugglers and petty operators, part of the hordes of minor 
black marketeers. MG's and the Germans authorities' early confrontation 
of these bewildering issues was in some respects surprisingly successful 
and in others prophetically dubious. 
Using these considerations as the framework, this thesis seeks to 
raise and answer the question of how the occupation got underway. How 
did US MG establish authority and direct law and order in a given area, 
and what were the challenges? This study documents early MG operation 
in Southern Bavaria-- mainly in Munich-- and observes two general 
themes: 1) how MG established its own authority; and 2) how that 
authority was applied and challenged in the realm of criminal law and 
order. These two dependent themes above correspond to two general parts 
of this study. The frrst part comprises Chapters Two and Three. Chapter 
Two provides background on the development of MG -- planning, 
personnel, operation, goals -- while Chapter Three examines the 
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establishment of MG control, indicates problems MG detachments faced, 
and illustrates how Germans were or were not allowed an early role. The 
second part contains the last three chapters. Chapter Four reveals how 
MG clarified its new order to Germans, and how MG allowed German 
police a role in the new order. Chapter Five presents crime issues typical 
of postwar chaos -- plundering, violent crimes, and the problem posed by 
the so-called Displaced Persons -- whereas Chapter Six evaluates the 
complex black market situation. 
The scale of the study is restricted. I focus on a particular region, 
explore specific local issues, and limit the scope to a rather brief and 
chaotic but critical period. Historical works stressing local developments 
have been proven essential, and provide the inspiration for my research. 
Regional analyses of the Nazi period3 have shown how much local 
operations and events reveal about broad policy, overall reaction, and the 
tangible success of policy and purpose. John Gimbel's comprehensive 
1961 study of Marburg4 was one of the first works that brought this 
3william Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The 
Experience of a Single German Town 1922-1945, rev. ed. (New York: 
Franklin Watts, 1984); Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler's Power 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); Walter Rinderle and 
Bernard Norling, The Nazi Impact on a German Village (Lexington, KY: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 1993). 
4John Gimbel, A German Community under German American 
Occupation: Marburg, 1945-1952 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1961). See also: Rebecca Boehling, "German Municipal Self-Government 
and the Personnel Policies of the Local U.S. Military Government in 
Three Major Cities of the U.S. Zone of Occupation: Frankfurt, Munich, 
and Stuttgart," Archiv fiir Sozialgeschichte, 25 (1985): 333-383; Lutz 
Niethammer, "Die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht zwischen 
Verwaltungstradition und politischen Parteien in Bayem 1945," 
Vierteliahreshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, 15.2 (1967): 153-210; Edward N. 
Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977); Hans Woller, Gesellschaft 
beneficial level of discernment to the subject of the US occupation. The 
local study can reveal many fresh aspects by following how an MG 
detachment performed habitually-- in spite of and according to the 
policy, handbooks and discourse. 
Through the "lens" of local emphasis, this thesis aims to 
demonstrate how the process of MG was performed and how Germans 
were affected by it. This theme corresponds to the time period I have 
chosen. In the first few months of the occupation, the fundamentals of 
authority were laid almost solely on the local level in Western Germany. 
This was a critical challenging stage of incubation for modem Germany, 
but also for US MG, US occupation leaders and the future route of US 
foreign policy. In this atmosphere, Americans began to learn the lessons 
and study the messages necessacy for assuming the decisive 
international role the US is charged with today. Although the MG 
experience throughout the US Zone of occupation shared similar traits, 
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it was on the local level in the early occupation that the fundamentals of 
authority were laid. 
I attempt to reveal how US MG succeeded, failed, muddled through 
and managed in its first days in one region of Southern Bavaria. 
Although I provide broader background information on my subject, I 
admit that some of the following narrative might appear to lack a 
framework to the reader unfamiliar with the occupation. At the risk of 
seeming episodic, the text details many spontaneous initiatives, 
und Politik in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone: Die Region Ansbach 
und Furth (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1968). For an insightful and dramatic 
personal account of local conditions, see: Saul K. Padover, Experiment 
in Germany (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946). 
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unforeseen problems, practical proposals, relentless challenges, and 
expedient solutions, all within a very unstable period. It shows how a 
process was begun, not how it ended. It does not attempt to give the 
whole picture, but rather wants to give a representative view of the period 
and subject on a smaller but hopefully lucid framework. The larger 
political aims, goals, and decisions -- the broad strokes and the grand 
peaks-- are presented in suitably extensive studies.5 These classically 
comprehensive analyses are unmistakably invaluable. They provide the 
proper framework and basis, and make investigations such as mine 
possible. 
Part of the problem of "fmding a framework" lies in the fact that 
this work explores many themes not much researched or described. 6 
Thorough consideration of local police reestablishment, characteristic 
crime issues, or Displaced Persons hardly exists, in German or English. 
There is no substantial local examination of the relationship between 
5Amertcans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in 
Germany and Japan, 1944-1952, ed. Robert Wolf (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984); Eugene 
Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1959); John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: The Politics 
and the Military, 1945-49 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); 
Die Kapitulation von 1945 und der Neubeginn in Deutschland, ed. 
Winfried Becker (Cologne: Bohlau Verlag, 1987); Edward H. Litchfield 
and Associates, Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1953); Harold Zink, The United States in-Germany 
1944-45 (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1957). For emphasis on the tactical 
army's role in the occupation, see: Franklin M. Davis Jr., Come as a 
Conqueror: The United States Army's Occupation of Germany 1945-49 
(New York: Macmillan, 1967); Earl F. Ziemke, Army Historical Series: The 
U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Army Center of Military History, 1975). 
6Where these issues receive any treatment at all I attempt to note 
accordingly in the footnotes. 
any of these issues and the early establishment of MG authority, in the 
rural or urban arena. There is a mountain of material to cover in these 
and other areas. I hope this work begins to fill some gaps. 
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The lack of comprehensive primacy sources is a problem to 
overcome for such an unstable period. Copies of local MG records --
microfll.med and housed in the Bayertsches Hauptstaatsarchiv -- are 
naturally the most useful records for much of what is explored here. The 
records are far from ideal, however. They are full of flaws and regularly 
recapitulate in imprecise terms, identifying groups and problems rather 
than personalities and explanations. Nevertheless, some issues in these 
pages can only be explored through such records. Black marketeers, for 
example, did not keep records of their methods, nor did robber bands 
generally record their exploits. Crippled by missing, imprisoned or fired 
officials and faced with drastic material shortages, local police were 
unable to maintain normally thorough records. MG records are the most 
inclusive sources available. The material includes not simply MG officers' 
observations but also the summation of material provided by Germans 
responsible for reporting to MG. Apart from the MG records and 
contemporacy newspapers, I use secondacy sources from German 
historians for the bulk of this work. I hope this approach enabled me to 
offer some altematt~e to the prevailing English-language sources. 
CHAPTER II 
US MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY OCCUPATION 
US Militacy Government detachments held deeply significant 
responsibilities and were to carcy out highly problematic tasks. The early 
role of the MG detachment was that of strict disciplinarian and harsh 
policeman, but would soon evolve into that of guiding master and 
invaluable patron. Throughout the early oc.cupation the MG detachment 
remained the source that tactical US militacy, Germans and Displaced 
Persons alike would turn to for help for a myriad of problems influenced 
by local, regional and international decisions and conditions. MG was 
created to address evecy possible challenge arising from the brutal war 
and a sometimes equally tiring occupation. 
Along with the endless string of dilemmas, MG performance on 
eve:ry level and in every region was burdened with a succession of 
alterations: clashing orders from tactical commanders; changeable 
policies from above; alternating directives from within; conflicting 
personnel types; continuous personnel redeployment and scarcities, and 
changeable loyalties, needs and deeds from native Germans, refugees, 
and Displaced Persons alike. 
In the early stage of the occupation, MG was most concerned with 
controlling the situation, and getting things to work again. The proper 
political goals to pursue would be honed later. The drastic conditions, 
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intense pressures, unclear policies and inconsistent quality of the 
detachments meant that MG in a given area could vary widely in 
performance. Local Germans, cut off from the rest of their society, 
attempted at times to test the MG officers' limits and initiate their own 
reforms and governments. Few of these were allowed, and those that were 
did not last long. 
This work is not a comprehensive analysis of the broad 
organizational and political factors influencing the US occupation of 
Germany. Nevertheless, suitable background on US MG is essential 
before turning to more specific consideration of MG's role. This chapter 
provides the framework for the rest of the work by offering a brief 
breakdown of MG's purpose, organization and general experience in the 
early occupation. 
ORIGINS OF US MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
In wartime planning for the occupation, the experience of the post-
World War I Rhineland occupation was a decisive factor. It was clear to 
the War Department that the "tactical," or combat troops then assigned 
the tasks of occupation were not well trained or suited for their role. As a 
result of these considerations, the War Department added to the four 
"classic" staff divisions in the regular army -- Personnel, Intelligence, 
Operations, Supply-- an agency specifically for MG. This fifth staff 
section, Civil Affairs, or G-5, was intended to better address the special 
problems that arose after hostilities ceased. The organizational 
foundation for this new staff was the existing administration for military 
police. The Provost Marshal General had the responsibility of training 
MG personnel. I 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL 
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From 1943 on, MG and general staff administrative personnel 
received specific training in various schools in the US and England. 
Recruits for MG came from the regular army as well as civilian life. The 
professional militacy men recruited for MG generally had "little 
knowledge ofGerman·language, culture, or histocy and even less aptitude 
for civilian administration .... But they were at the top of the 
hierarchy. "2 Civilian recruits specially trained for MG held various 
professional positions in the fields of higher education, journalism, law, 
and labor. Despite their previous civilian or MG training, many recruits 
were not given positions in which they could exercise their acquired 
skills. Knowledge of German was preferred, but was rare among 
American-born MG personnel because of the lack of time necessary for 
preparation. 3 
Two groups made up the specially trained MG officers. In one group 
were the technical and administrative experts. In the other group were 
emigrants from German-speaking areas together with first and second 
1Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 157-58. 
2soehling, 334. 
3soehling 340; Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 160. 
generation German-Americans. This second group acted mainly as 
language, cultural, and political experts and served in political 
intelligence, the public safety, or information control branches. Few of 
these men were career officers or not to attain higher ranks, 4 as the 
higher ranks were more open to MG officers who came from army stock 
but in many cases were less qualified for MG tasks. 
PURPOSE, OPERATION, AND PLANNING 
13 
The initial mission of MG was limited. MG comprised a separate 
organization of specialists, yet in the early wartime phase of the 
occupation MG belonged and remained subordinate to the tactical army. 
Busy tactical army staffs were much more concerned with exigent 
milita:ry operations than unfamiliar MG objectives. In selling the 
incorporation of MG to reluctant combat staffs, the Provost Marshal 
General, Allen W. Gullion, described two restrained objectives for MG:5 
First, to help bring the war to a successful termination; second 
and entirely subordinate to the first consideration, to further the 
welfare of the people of the occupied territo:ry . . . . What matters 
most is that the commanding general in any field of operations be 
given as complete control as possible over all the elements that 
must enter into the calculations. 
During wartime operations General Eisenhower, although supreme 
milita:ry governor, entrusted his authority to generals commanding the 
4Boehling 340. 
5Allen W. Gullion (Provost Marshal General), "Milita:ry 
Government," Coast Artillery Journal, 86 (1943): 2, qtd. in Niethammer, 
"Besatzungsmacht" 159. 
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various army groups. Eisenhower exercised his power only to make major 
decisions and to scrutinize when absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, 
neither the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), 
the combined English-American high command, or the Army groups 
directly commanded MG in the early phase. Direction of MG rested with 
the individual armies themselves, but they controlled MG only carelessly 
and inconsistently.6 
The incorporation of MG staffs in the General staff structure 
tempered its ability to fulfill its mission. As of March, 1944, the MG 
staffs served under the general staffs on the army group, army, corps and 
division level. Nevertheless, within this structure a network of MG 
special staffs, or detachments, were intended to make up for the lack of 
autonomy. In all counties? (Kreise and the rural Landkreise), cities, 
provinces, bureaucratic territories and states (Lander) in enemy territory, 
MG detachments, specially oriented in local conditions, moved in with 
the advancing combat troops and attempted to establish rule over its 
area. The immediate instigation of "indirect rule" --installing 
"acceptable" Germans in administrative positions over which MG 
mandated.-- was preferred, but in cases of complete breakdown of 
·German administration the detachment would administer temporartly.8 
6Hajo Holborn, American Military Government. Its Organization 
and Policies (Washington D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947) 48. 
7Kreis and Landkrels can also be translated as "administrative 
districts." 
8Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 159. 
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In the early phase of the occupation, the main tasks of MG were to 
·hinder the German civilian population from disrupting military 
operations, but at the same time to secure the interim supervision of and 
care for those civilians. MG was to simply "get things going again; .. g it 
was to apply "apolitical" methods of, above all, a practical and effective 
nature. The "shaping of the postwar world" would be left to later civilian 
administrators and politicians.1 0 Consummating military objectives, 
establishing an "order," and setting up MG itself was the emphasis. 
Implementation of such methods has elicited the criticism that in this 
crucial period of "democratization," the chances for "real" reform were 
lost to a "milder," political and administrative continuity.11 
MG's mission of guaranteeing "public safety" in the early and 
chaotic months of the occupation -- the theme of subsequent chapters --
was crucial to the success of the early occupation. Accordingly, in the 
early phase MG was allowed influence over the traditional army only 
within these critical domains of "law and order" and "military 
security. "12 This corresponded to the MG's purpose of assuring a stable 
environment for the US tactical troops, as well as for the occupied 
population. Since US troops were entering areas of untold ruin and 
9Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 161. 
10Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 158-59. 
11Boehling 382. See also: Leonard Krieger, "The Potential for 
Democratization in Occupied Germany," Public Policy, ed. John D. 
Montgomery and Albert 0. Hirschman, vol. 17, {Cambridge, Mass: 
HaiVard University Press.1968) 28-58. 
12Ntethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 158. 
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disorder, maintaining public safety had to be one of the ''first and major" 
aims of MG offlcers.13 
On the local level, MG often found it difficult to attempt the 
application of its aims. MG was at the mercy of tactical commanders 
who had little appreciation of MG's mission. Furthermore, the tactical 
commanders' tolerance for MG and its assignment differed greatly from 
unit to unit. These factors contributed to great differences in the 
administration and effectiveness of MG from area to area.14 The 
"dualism" of tactical and MG commanders working side by side easily led 
to confused circumstances. The troop commander was concerned with 
military objectives, whereas the MG detachment officers hoped to 
resurrect an efficient local administration. Orders from a troop 
commander were often canceled by the MG detachment, or the opposite 
happened. As a result the local German administrators were frequently 
confused as to what their American occupiers wanted.15 
The MG detachments soon became independent of the tactical 
army. During the months following the capitulation, MG gradually broke 
away from the regular army structure, came under the direction of 
General Lucius D. Clay, 16 and assumed a greater role for itself. Spring 
13Holborn 33. 
14Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 159. Niethammer notes that as 
the G-5 structure was grafted onto the tactical staff structure, troop 
commanders were ordered to consider MG's tasks a major objective, yet 
that order probably came too late to have much effect. 
15Boehling 541 . 
l6works on General Clay and the occupation include Clay's 
account: Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY: 
17 
and Summer 1945 were months of"feverish redeployment." The 
enormous Allied administration of SHAEF was officially dissolved at the 
end of June 1945.17 The capitulation in Europe made many combat 
personnel available for duty in MG positions. The number of MG 
personnel doubled by July. 18 By September the "regime" of a US wartime 
occupation army had disintegrated and given way to a more autonomous 
system and clear hierarchy of MG. In October 1945 the now independent 
G-5, or Civil Affairs branch responsible for MG, was renamed OMGUS 
(Office of MG for the US Zone of Germany), and the regional MG (RMG) 
for Bavaria became OMGB (Office of MG for Bavaria).19 
The MG detachments had an ambiguous role in the early period. 
On the one hand, they had to maintain security for military goals and 
the initial care of the civilian population, which demanded strong 
measures, including the shutting out of any officials with links to the 
Nazi party; on the other hand, they were to "dominate" affairs in their 
area only when necessaty, and to appoint competent Germans able to get 
things running again. This became problematic since many of the 
Doubleday & Company, 1950. See also: The Papers of General Lucius D. 
Clay: Germany 1945-1949, Ed. Jean Edward Smith, 2 vols., 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974); Jean Edward Smith, 
Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1990. On Clay's successor in Germany, John J. McCloy, see: Thomas 
Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
1 7Holbom 50. 
18Holbom 47. 
19Ntethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 155; 168-170. 
available capable figures, having lived in a society as politicized as the 
Third Reich, had some sort of a "link" with the Nazi party. 
18 
The preference for indirect rule, or guidance as opposed to 
domination, hinted at the broader, later goals of the occupation: to not 
"impose" democracy, but to only impose "restraints upon those elements 
of the German population who would prevent democracy from being 
established."20 "Democracy" would be built from the ground up, and 
government decentralized, according to the Potsdam Agreement of August 
2, 1945. The towns and Landkreise, for example, were the first 
administrative units in which German self-government was established, 
in the American zone as well as in the other four zones. Furthermore, US 
combat commanders, in the early phase -- when tQ.ey were in charge of 
the occupation -- thought it impractical, and too complicated, to 
attempt to control Germany by undertaking direct operating 
responsibilities. It was much simpler to oversee affairs administered by 
Germans themselves.21 
The early emphasis on an "apolitical" effectiveness was partly due 
to confused and ill-defined Allied policy. In 1944 the G-5, or the Civil 
Affairs section of SHAEF responsible for MG, began developing its own 
plans for MG procedure. The resulting plans, comprised in the SHAEF 
"Handbook for Militacy Government in Germany," were necessitated by a 
distinct lack of policy direction from Washington. G-5's formulations 
20carl J. Friedrich and Associates, American Experiences in 
Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart & Company, 
1948) 14, qtd. in Boehling, 335. 
21 Boehling 335. 
were very cautious; G-5 planners still expected final directives from 
Washington, but did not know how close Washington's policy would be 
to their own formulations. Thus, while waiting on Washington, G-5's 
own planners avoided political orientation and indoctrination.22 
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In the same period procedures were approved by the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff. CSS 551 ("Combined Directive For Military Government 
in Germany Prior to Defeat Or Surrender") of April28, 1944,23 consisted 
of .the most fundamental operational and political objectives and was to 
be valid only until the capitulation. After the capitulation the more 
comprehensive and politically oriented JCS 1067 ("Directive to 
Commander-In-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding 
Militruy Government of Germany") would be adopted.24 JCS 106725 was 
issued in April1945 and enumerated many of the broader policy 
statements later adopted by the Allied Powers in the Potsdam Agreement 
of August 2, 1945. 
Early in the occupation MG officers stuck to the directives of both 
the SHAEF handbooks and CSS 551. JCS 1067 appeared only at the end 
22Holborn 33. 
23Holbom 33; full text of CSS 551 in Holborn 135-43. 
24Niethammer, "B~satzungsmacht" 161. 
25Full text in Holborn 157-72, Documents on Germany. 1944-
1985, Office of the Historian, Department of State: Washington, D.C., 
1986, 15. For a brief piece on the evolution of JCS 1067, see Earl F. 
Ziemke, "The Formulation and Implementation of U.S. Occupation Policy 
in Germany," U.S. Occupation in Europe after World War II: Papers and 
Reminisces from the April23-24. 1976. Conference Held at the George C. 
Marshall Research Foundation. Lexington, Virginia (Lawrence: The 
Regents Press of Kansas, 1978). 
of hostilities, a demanding and insecure period, and a time when MG 
officers were already familiar with earlier, and less intricate, rules of 
procedure. Furthermore, many MG officers found JCS 1067 impractical 
in this early, chaotic period; it had little do with diverse and dire local 
conditions. Many MG officers simply ignored JCS 1067 early on.26 
20 
Nevertheless, the phase of pragmatism was short-lived. The 
demand for apolitical expediency gradually gave way during the summer 
of 1945 to the greater political and economic designs put forth by the 
Allied Powers, JCS 1067, as well as the heightened and better formulated 
role of MG. The phase of "improVisation" lasted until roughly the 
beginning of July. Corresponding to the disbanding ofSHAEFa thick, 
detailed MG directive book (USFET [United States Forces European 
Theater] "Administration of Militaty Government") came into effect. This 
set of directives interpreted the final version of JCS 1067 for MG and 
detailed implementation for the various specialized MG sections. At this 
time the "combat phase" of the occupation officially ended. 2 7 A 
prescribed and precisely delineated method of "denaziflcation"28 replaced 
the early practice of simply shutting out or imprisoning Nazi party 
26Niethammer, "Besatzungmacht" 161. 
27Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayem: Sauberung und 
Rehabilitation unter amerikanischer Besatzung (Frankfurt a. M.: S. 
Fischer, 1972); 149. 
28Niethammer, Entnaziflzierung 138ff. The complex evolution of 
denazification policy -- thoroughly explored by Niethammer and in 
monographs mentioned above-- will not be treated here. On 
denazification also see James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: 
Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
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members according to the judgment of the local MG commander or a CIC 
(Counter Intelligence Corps --army intelligence) officer. The 
implementation of JCS 1067 and the substantially defined MG directives 
became more certain after the Potsdam Agreement, and eventually 
confirmed the increasingly crucial status of MG for "reshaping" 
Germany.29 
Over the course of the occupation, MG detachments would 
increasingly yield responsibilities to German authorities. MG assumed 
more of an advisory role. At the same time, MG, with its own 
independent structure, better coordinated policy. 
CHAOS AND EXPEDIENCY 
The first MG detachments moving farther and farther into Bavaria 
under the wing of the advancing US armies encountered conditions of 
varied and usually bewildering complexity. As discussed, the German 
infrastructure was in many cases fully destroyed, and local 
administrations abandoned. The MG units themselves varied greatly in 
character and competence. 
MG personnel's status as members of combat units required them 
to employ "elasticity" and "effectiveness," two of the most important 
organizational principles of the advancing US combat troops. For the 
smaller MG units above all, elasticity meant self-reliance and the ability 
to arrive at decisions quickly and without advice from above. 
29Niethammer, "Besatzungmacht" 170. 
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Effectiveness was the "apolitical" emphasis on the immediate, pragmatic 
achievement ofMG and milltacy goals.30 
It can be argued that MG simply enjoyed neither the time nor 
resources to execute anything but the most pressing tasks. Ambitious 
and thorough political reform, or the strict reliance on "policy" could 
hardly have been foremost on MG officers' minds. Demands on MG 
included the following:31 
.... Restoring lines of communication .... discovering German 
resources useful to the Allied war effort, maintaining public safety, 
taking measures against epidemics, etc. High priority had also to 
be given to lending immediate assistance to United Nations 
nationals, of whom more than six million were expected to be 
encountered in the Western Zone of Germany. In addition, 
property of the Allies or of the United Nations held or robbed by 
the Nazis was to be taken into custody. 
Furthermore, although MG personnel increased, the amount of 
personnel available to complete such oveiWhelming jobs was still 
relatively small. Before VE-Day, only 7,500 officers and enlisted men 
comprised MG in all of Germany. 32 
The establishment of MG in many areas was marked by confusion, 
varied inventiveness, and sometimes scandal. MG teams and 
detachments had been "pin-pointed" for specific areas and districts. Yet 
the individual units often found themselves in regions unknown from 
preparations, and the units' ability to act with decisiveness was greatly 
tested: "These were the days in which any central direction of [MG] 
30Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 161. 
31Holbom 33. 
32Holborn 34. 
operations could hardly be attempted and the officer in the field had to 
find his own solutions ... 33 
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The complete breakdown of the German infrastructure, 
communications, and government increased the helplessness and 
isolation of the local German community. In this situation many a MG 
commander became the "lord" of his area, a situation that allowed him 
much leeway for reaching effective solutions.34 The chaos sometimes led 
to interestingly dubious situations. Such circumstances were much more 
pronounced in the rural areas and smaller towns than in the large cities, 
where the detachments had better information and more contact with 
higher-ups and central posts. 
Many MG commanders took ove·r their area with pronounced zeal 
and pride, hurried to set up the minimal administration and 
infrastructure necessacy, and attempted to build up their Kreise into a 
functional unit capable of sustaining itself. This sometimes occurred at 
the expense of a nearby "rival" Kreis and a competing MG officer. This 
brand of "enthusiasm" often resulted in the phenomenon of the 
Kreiskonige (the "kings of the Kreis"): MG commanders who consolidated 
their area without consideration for greater needs or common policy. 
Eager MG officers sometimes hurriedly named to chief positions 
Germans they truste,d or were advised to rely on. Consistent throughout 
the US-controlled areas was a naive dependance on recommendations of 
33Holborn 34. 
34 Niethammer, En tnazifizierung 138-139. 
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Catholic Church authorities.35 In many cases figures given 
responsibilies turned out to be controversial or unacceptable in respect 
to military security and political reliability. Many "criminal types," or 
simple charlatans found their way into high posts by, for example, 
simply claiming an anti-Nazi stance, a needed skill, or playing upon the 
innocent outlook of some MG commanders. The professional competence 
of local German candidates was a distinct advantage, as was English 
language ability.36 Other characters were installed and supported fully, 
only to be identified as "big Nazis" and lose their positions days later. In 
the confusion, some opportunists were reported to Cic,37 some were not. 
Ultimately, it was the mission of tactical troops to consummate 
the defeat of Germany in accord with military objectives, and the 
responsibility of MG to rebuild local German structures in agreement 
with increasingly political aims. In the first months of the occupation 
however, chaotic conditions demanded that these two distinct goals 
would be combined to a certain extent, even when tactical commanders 
35Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 161-166; Niethammer, 
Entnazifizierung 138-143. 
36Niethammer, Entnazifizierung 141. English was the "official" 
language during the occupation: all written material pertaining to 
matters overseen by MG had to be in English (Chronik der Stadt 
Miinchen, ed. Wolffram Selig, [Miinchen: Stadtarchiv, 1980] 59). 
37Niethammer ("Besatzungsmacht" 162) notes that various 
military intelligence groups existed in this period. They were being re-
deployed and or absorbed into other agencies, but the status of many 
intelligence personnel was unclear. Many agents simply stayed on in a 
territory and served at their own initiative until their future was 
clarified. Such figures contributed to an intelligence rivalry that led to 
uncoordinated and irregular data. 
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lost influence. Furthermore, early occupation policy was incongruous 
and left many local MG detachments to reach their own conclusions as 
to the manner in which milita:ry government should establish itself. 
In this environment, dilemmas and errors were unavoidable. 
Nevertheless, whatever the policy or predicament, in the first months of 
the occupation, the establishment of an "order" was a crucial, imperative 
job for MG to perform. The occupation agenda could not progress 
without the assurance of relative stability. Under these circumstances, 
the assurance of public safety-- of law and order -- became a 
fundamental element of MG control. 
CHAPTER III 
LOCAL ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
Advancing into Southern Bavaria in mid-April 1945, US forces of 
the Seventh and Third Army encountered a few final moments of serious 
fighting. A bloody four-day battle for Nuremberg destroyed what was left 
of an already crippled city.l Nevertheless, the pace at which US forces 
covered ground hinted that the war would soon be over. On April 23, the 
Seventh Army's lOth Armored Division took twenty-eight towns in a 
single day. "Pinpoint" MG detachments, those specifically trained to 
govern a particular area, were in many cases moving in on the same day 
as the combat troops.2 Developments were moving fast, despite what 
turned out to be needless caution exercised by US forces entering the 
notorious "last redoubt," or Alpenfestung --the rugged Alpine areas south 
of Munich believed to be prepared by Nazi diehards for a vicious last 
stand.3 As it turned out, US combat troops were not put to any great 
test in Southern Bavaria. 
lziemke, Army247. 
2ziemke, Army 249. 
3Both Allied leaders and Nazi leaders were duped by widespread 
belief in the invincibility of the Alpenfestung. Allied planners chose to 
follow their fears instead of intelligence facts, while Nazi leaders ignored 
the facts and embraced the rumours of the final stand in the Bavarian 
Alps. The myth of the "last redoubt" is chronicled in: Rodney G. Minott, 
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For local MG detachments, however, many great challenges were 
just beginning. MG detachments began the arduous task of establishing 
themselves in a given area and setting up local authority. Events in the 
Bavarian capital of Munich described below -- and in subsequent 
chapters -- illustrate issues indicative of the early occupation, but also 
contrasts to the norm. A brief account of the situation in Landkreis 
Miesbach serves to further reveal disparities in readiness among MG 
detachments. Lastly, depiction of the fleeting, problematic Freiheits-Aktion 
Bayem resistance movement reveals an unexpected challenge to US 
occupiers. 
MIESBACH.: MILITARY GOVERNMENT AUF DEM LANDE 
Various standards of MG implementation can be seen in the 
situation in rural areas and smaller towns. There are many similar 
examples from the reports of rural Kreis-detachments.4 The following MG 
accounts from Kreis Miesbach clearly depict the irregular implementation 
of MG. In comparison with the Munich situation detailed in the rest of 
this work, this brief summacy of Miesbach MG reveals how completely 
different a detachment could perform in an area just a few miles from 
Munich. 
The Fortress That Never Was (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1964). 
4BayHStA, OMGUS Annual, Monthly, and Weekly Detachment 
Reports. 
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The rural Landkreis capital of Miesbach was itself quite different 
from the Munich metropolis, and gathered far less attention. The 
Miesbach MG detachment was clearly not nearly as prepared or suitably 
staffed for its mission as the highly capable and informed Munich MG 
detachment. MG reports for Miesbach also serve to demonstrate how MG 
authorities judged their own performance. 
Some of the developments described exceed the period this study 
emphasizes but are worthy of brief mention, as Miesbach, like many 
"insignificant" areas, lived With controversy well after the beginning 
months of the occupation. 
Miesbach is not well known and deserves an introduction. 
Miesbach is a typical Landkreis just south of Munich, and lies in the 
passes between the Alpine foothills and the Bavarian Alps. As it is today, 
the town of Miesbach was in 1945 Kreisstadt, or capital of the county 
(thus sharing the same name as the Landkreis), as well as the chief 
market town in the Kreis. It retained all the main government offices and 
courts. The Landkreis was and is today a popular German resort area. In 
1945 the Landkreis was overwhelmingly Catholic: 54,356 inhabitants 
were Catholic, 8,549 Protestant, and 1 ,872 of other religions. The town of 
Miesbach was best represented by employees of industry and handicrafts, 
the Landkreis by farmers. Trade and handicraft were an old tradition 
there, as Miesbach allegedly once profitted fro~ a Roman Road.5 
5BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/51-3/2, "Description of a Landkreis" 4-9. 
A note on MG documents: "BayHStA" denotes the Bayerisches 
Hauptsaatsarchiv and "OMGB" Organized Milita:ry Government of 
Bavaria. "(Y)" is an internal designation of the Bayerisches 
Hauptstaatsarchiv; the numbers stand for number, box, and folder and 
Landkreis Miesbach was known during the war as the "Nazi air-raid 
shelter." Many party members, military men, and industrialists moved 
their families there during the war and remained thereafter. 6 
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The war inflicted little devastation to the Kreisstadt Miesbach but 
much to the Landkreis in general. 7 As was the case in many rural 
Bavarian Landkreisen, a major problem in Miesbach was the arrival of 
refugees.18.5% of the 66,547 inhabitants of the Landkreis in 1945 were 
refugees who had never resided in Bavaria before the war. Many more 
were flooding in from the Munich area. Furthermore, 3,228 POWs native 
to the area had not yet returned. These numbers reveal that Miesbach 
was representative of large parts of rural Bavaria which did not suffer 
great damage to housing;8 in the case of Miesbach the increases in 
refugees absorbed housing formerly devoted to the tourist trade, and 
Army requisitioning absorbed other spaces. 9 
A MG team sent in 1947 to investigate occupation conditions in 
Landkreis Miesbach found the situation unfortunate but typical. 
Investigations held there, "if probed to equal depth would reveal similar 
conditions elsewhere." 10 
are set apart accordingly. Where page numbers are not given there were 
none in the reports. 
6BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/92-1/25, "Investigation ofLandkreis 
Miesbach." 
7BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/51-3/2, "Description" 5. 
8BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/51-3/2, "Description" 8. 
9BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/92-1/25, "Investigation." 
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What did the occupation authorities fmd improper in Miesbach? In 
areas such as Miesbach the phase between the end of combat operations 
and the establishment of MG was often thoroughly confused. Around the 
time of the German capitulation the MG detachment intended for 
Miesbach was held up in another nearby Kreis, Bad Aibling. It was forced 
to serve there for a brief time because tactical forces would not give up 
the Miesbach area to the specially trained MG detachments.11 
The original detachment did assume responsibility for Miesbach, 
but only on May 16, 1945, over a week after the capitulation.12 Who was 
in charge at that time is unclear. Operations in this first week were very 
chaotic, dangerous, and somewhat scandalous, according to this telling 
report on Miesbach from the week of May 13-20:13 
Public alarmed over Army police permitting SS officers and a 
limited number of enlisted men to remain armed with some 
freedom. Three civilians shot (one a CIC informant, fatally) by such 
elements. Troops under command of German General von Hahn, 
10sayHStA OMGB(Y) 10192-1125, "Investigation." The file of a CIC 
investigating team in Miesbach dated December 1945 (BayHStA 
OMGB(Y) 10192-1 I 5) was labelled "restricted" and thus unavailable to 
this writer. Nevertheless, the later investigating team quoted here 
concurred (10192-1 125, "Investigation") with the restricted findings of 
the CIC team. 
11BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10177-311, Miesbach detachment "Annual 
Historical Report" 1945 I 46 (hereafter: Miesbach AHR) 1. The reasons for 
this are unclear. Ne't"ertheless, the decision was presumably a strictly 
operational one -- as of May 1 the US Seventh Army's advance had not 
fully incorporated the Miesbach area (Dieter Wagner, Miinchen '45 
zwischen Ende und Anfang, [Munich: Siiddeutscher Verlag, 1970] 36). 
12BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10177-311, Miesbach AHR 1. 
13BayHStA OMGB(Y) 131142-117, Weekly MG for Munich Report 
(hereafter MG Weekly), May 13-20, 1945. 
who has complete freedom of movement. It is asserted he 
repeatedly stated in addressing his men that the war is not lost 
and another German Army will be formed. 
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The Miesbach detachment was initially commanded by Major Louis 
L. Haupt14 and consisted of six officers and eleven enlisted men. This 
original detachment was trained in Shrivenham, England, and prepared 
further in Civil Mfairs branch centers in France and Belgium.15 The 
detachment did not last long in its original state. It went through 
countless changes of personnel; 16 a reflection of the massive 
redeployment and demobilization after VE-Day. 
There was clear friction between the two noted "styles" of MG 
officer. A compelling passage written by a Miesbach MG officer reveals 
how one officer viewed the effects of the "duality" of MG personnel. If his 
judgement is accurate, the constant changes surely affected the ability of 
the unit to perform: 1 7 
Many officers and enlisted men have worked for this Detachment 
with vacying proficiency. It is interesting to observe that many of 
the officers and Enlisted Men coming to the Detachment fresh 
from tactical [combat] units have done more efficient and more 
honest work than those trained for months in ECAD [European 
Civil Affairs Division] schools. The series of pools in which many 
14BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10177-311, MiesbachAHR 1. Useful 
information on all but the major MG officers is unfortunately 
unavailable to this researcher. 
15BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10 I 77-3 I 1, Miesbach AHR 1. The author of 
the report notes ( 1) that no member of this detachment personnel "had 
any actual experience in Military Government." 
16BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10177-311, Miesbach AHR 1. 
17BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10177-311, Miesbach AHR 3. The name or 
background of the au thor is not accessible. 
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specialized Militaty Government Officers were forced to stagnate 
over a year was as vicious a system as can be conceived: there is 
hardly a man who has passed through it who has not given 
concrete evidence of demoralization in the most exact sense of the 
word. The long sterile inactivity, the theoretical half fish, half fowl 
militacy training, killed all enthusiasm and interest in the officers 
and men, and many became subject to a complete moral 
breakdown. In the field, where the best results can be obtained by 
a strict application of directives issued by higher headquarters, 
officers and men trained as tactical troops to obey and implement 
orders often accomplished the objectives of Military Government 
more completely than by officers trained out of mind on undigested 
material who have decided that they know better than the 
directives . . . . 
The author of this passage most likely came to MG from the ranks of the 
tactical army. 
Common in the Landkreisen was a lack of what MG considered 
acceptable, competent Germans to head posts.18 A look at the 
succession of men holding the title of Miesbach Landrat, the head of the · 
Landkreis administration, reveals the problems MG faced in finding 
suitable administrators and identifying suspect ones. Shortly before US 
troops arrived in the area, Frick, the last Third Reich Landrat (and son of 
the Minister of the Interior who preceeded Himmler), committed suicide. 
His deputy took over but was promptly removed by the detachment. A 
pre-1933 Landrat, von Wehner, remained in office until August 1, 1945, 
but "his competence and pleasant nature alone" could not hold him in 
office, since "his past was too damning:" He had been a senior civil 
18This work does not consider in great detail the political aspects 
of MG's reluctance to empower the sudden glut of "anti-Nazis," or the 
controversial Denazification process. Nevertheless, both themes will be 
referred to in the following sections on the Freiheits-Aktion-Bayern and 
the reestablishment of German police. On the subject of German 
administrative continuity and the possibility of reform, see Boehling 333-
383. 
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servant from 1927 to 1944, a Wehrmacht major and served as Military 
Governor in Belgium during the war. He was succeeded by Leopold 
Schindler, who had no compromising associations with the Nazi party. 
At first he seemed excellent but then it became clear that he was both 
"paranoiac and a psychopathic mythomaniac." He was finally removed in 
May 1946, "to the relief of the public." A KPD (Kommunistische Partei 
Deutschlands) member, Reith, held the position until Baron von Schoen, 
former German Ambassador to Chile, was elected by the Kreis tag .19 This 
election was disapproved by MG, and Reith assumed the position again, 
but temporartly.20 
The detachment "had the same problems [as) in many towns and 
Kreise[; ] .... many MG officers were flattered by competent officials who 
nevertheless had a NAZI past and were reluctant to let them go. "21 The 
194 7 investigation of Miesbach conditions found that:22 
. . . . Military Government in Miesbach lacked judgement, 
intelligence and impartiality-- from the beginning. This is equally 
apparent to the present team. The records reveal superficial 
investigations and approvals of [local German) MG employees and 
of local German government officials, and careless enforcement of 
MG policies. 
After preparing over 150 files on individuals assigned positions by MG, 
receiving over 200 intercepts and conducting numerous interviews, the 
168). 
19The first local elections were allowed on May 26, 1946 (Chronik 
20BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/77-3/1, Miesbach AHR 5-8. 
21BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/77-3/1, Miesbach AHR 8. 
22BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/92-1/25, "Investigation." 
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investigators were "favorably impressed" with only four individuals. The 
MG commander was ultimately responsible: the team disclosed that the 
"negligence, malfeasance and unfitness" of German officials approved by 
MG "should not have escaped attention by the series of M.G.O.'s ([sic] 
Military Government Officers-- in this case the commanding MG officer) 
at Miesbach."23 
In Miesbach the practice of indirect rule was fraught with 
difficulty. The patterns the team criticized were set in motion from the 
beginning of the occupation, a time when any communication with 
Germans -- apart from giving commands -- was forbidden. A non-
fraternization policy was in effect under the simple justification that "all 
Germans are Nazis."24 However, in Landkreisen such as Miesbach, the 
"cooperation" between occupier and occupied appeared too amiable for 
visiting MG authorities, and for detachment insiders as well. The author 
of the Miesbach detachment's "Annual Historical Report" felt it 
necessacy to add this summacy of the situation:25 
It has been proved over and and over again that the officer who is 
lulled into confidence by a surface obsequiousness is forgetting an 
essential fact: no people loves or trusts or essentially wishes to 
help the power. that occupies it. 
23BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/92-1/25, "Investigation." 
24Boehling 341-343. Boehling (342) points out that: "The non-
fraternization directive did not help the incoming MG detachments in 
making their decisions about which Germans to appoint to 
administrative posts, nor did it encourage anti-Nazis who might have 
been in teres ted in working with the Allies constructively toward restoring 
democracy." 
25BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/77-3/1, Miesbach AHR. 
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The investigators from CIC concluded by recommending numerous 
dismissals of Germans in positions high and low. Regarding the 
detachment itself, the team did not want to "minimize the poor 
inheritance bequeathed to the present MGO by earlier Military 
Government officers." Nevertheless, the team found the MGO "little 
better endowed with the qualities of impartiality and judgement than his 
[many] predecessors," and recommended his immediate replacement.26 
It is evident that the Landkretsen dilemmas characteristic of the 
first days were not resolved quickly. Of course, as touched upon earlier, 
the need for military security and stabilization of chaotic conditions 
made the application of political reform and purging in the first days 
only secondary in importance. In Miesbach political cleansing did not 
seem to become as important as it was supposed to be later. Naturally, 
the Miesbach example is not indicative of MG in general, nor is it a 
judgment of MG in general. It does, however, demonstrate the difficulties 
MG faced when dealing With local conditions and performing its tasks 
under constant changes of command and in isolated areas. 
MUNICH: THE FIRST DAYS 
Munich, of course, was definitely not Miesbach. The Bavarian 
capital held much significance -- not only because of the city's status as 
the Hauptstadt der Bewegung ("Capital of the [National Socialist] 
Movement") in the Third Reich, but also as a prominent Groj3stadt. The 
26BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/92-1/25, "Investigation." 
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appointments and responses of Munich MG had greater significance than 
anywhere else in Bavaria. Munich MG most directly expressed the 
intentions of the RMG for Bavaria. Without German administration on 
the Land (state) level, many of the responsibilities and measures MG in 
Munich held or oversaw sufficed initially as Land-Wide ones.27 
Munich MG was well-prepared for its important role. The unit was 
better trained, informed and staffed than the typical MG unit. The 
Munich detachment was formed in England in 1944. Mter scrutinizing 
relatively detailed information on Munich area conditions and known 
figures, the unit formulated a plan of feasible operations. Since Munich 
had better, more specifically trained detachment personnel than the 
other US Zone cities, as well as more pertinent background information, 
it was easier in Munich to put theocy into practice. Part of the reason for 
this lay in the fact that US forces took Munich so late-- there was more 
time to learn about conditions from Germans recently living there, and 
the detachment was able to learn from other detachments' problems.28 
In any case Munich's status as the birthplace of the Nazi movement 
demanded special MG attention.29 
The city was taken almost Without any resistance. In the early 
hours of April 30, around 2:00a.m., a forward US unit, supported by 
27wagner 158; Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht" 177. 
28For description of how the situation in the first city occupied by 
US troops, Aachen, influenced later MG practice, see Niethammer, 
"Besatzungsmach t" 1 72- 1 77. 
29Boehling 358-359: " .... the retired [Munich MG commander] 
Keller wrote in 1959 that 'we knew Munich better than we did our own 
homes."' 
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armor, was able to reach the Prinzregentenplatz east of central Munich. 
They came under only sparse, uncoordinated fire from civilians which the 
troops quickly located and disarmed. The unit's goal was to set up a 
command post at a specific, indeed symbolic spot nearby: Hitler's private 
Munich residence in the Regentenstrq[je. They took this without 
resistance. 30 The main advancing troops experienced few skirmishes. The 
Third, Forty-Second, and Forty-Fifth divisions of the US Seventh Army 
reaching the outskirts of the city encountered only small, sporadic 
groups ofWaffen-SS soldiers. Pasing, a significant suburb west of the 
central city, was occupied by 8:15 a.m .. 31 
The official surrender of the city was an initially confused but 
basically routine undertaking. Between 1:45 and 2:00p.m. on April30, a 
US reconnaissance unit riding in a jeep found the streets uncannily 
quiet, and continued until reaching the Marienplatz in front of Munich's 
Rathaus (city hall). A huge crowd of just released POWs and Miinchner32 
cheered them, but after a few minutes the unit pressed on. An hour or so 
later another probing US jeep, this one from the Information Control 
Division (lCD), stopped to observe the curious, spirited crowd on the 
30wagner 126-127: the unit immediately took an inventocy of the 
Fuhrer's flat. Apart from a bust of Geli Raubal -- Hitler's niece and once 
alleged lover -- twelve autographed editions of Mein Kampf were the most 
notable fmds. 
31wagner 128. 
32Niethammer ("Besatzungsmacht". 1 '(6) notes that large sections 
of the population greeted the Americans' arrival as the "final blow" 
liberating them from tyranny and war ("Der Einzug der Amerikaner wurde 
in breiten Schichten der Bevolkerung als bejreiender Schluflstrich unter 
Gewaltherrschajt und Krieg empjunden"). 
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Marienplatz. The occupants of this second jeep also left shortly thereafter 
to resume their inspection. Remarkably, the Munich official ordered to 
stay in the Rathaus and handle the surrender, Dr Michael Meister,33 
claimed to have missed both episodes from his location inside the 
Rathaus. The "official" Munich capitulation was fmally arranged later in. 
the day, and took place in a private Munich residence between an 
unidentified US General and Meister.34 
Early in the morning of May 1, the Munich MG detachment arrived 
at the Munich Rathaus to begin operations. The detachment was headed 
by Lt. Col. Walter H. Kurtz and his assistant Lt. Col. Eugene Keller, Jr. 
Concerning the Munich MG commander Kurtz, visiting MG observers 
noted the following: 35 
33aecause of his English ability, Meister, Director of the 
Rechtsabteilung im Emiihrungs- und Wirtschc:iftsamt, was ordered by a 
representative of the Nazi-Oberbiirgermeister Fiehler to remain in the 
Rathaus so he could officially surrender the city (Wagner 134 ). 
34 Hans-Gunter Richardi, "Bejubelt -- doch von der Geschichte 
iibersehen," Siiddeutsche Zeitung [Munich], 8 Oct. 1993: 47. This recent 
article refutes the long-held assumption that the leader of the second US 
unit to pass over the Marienplatz, Ernest Langendorf, a German native 
serving as an lCD officer, was actually the first US "liberator." 
Furthermore, the article reveals that the commonly documented 
surrender of the Munich Rathaus (in Boehling 358; Chronik 42) is false. 
The insufficient official history of Munich MG (US Army Historical 
Division, Headquarters European Command, Military Government in 
Munich 1945-1947, vol. 1, Special Studies Series 3, [N.p.:1951] 1) states 
only that "(Munich] surrendered on the evening of 30 April to Lieutenant 
General Wade H. Haislip's XV Corps. 
35aayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/451 /2, Operations Report of Munich 
MG (hereafter: Op. Report), July 8, 1945, 28. Unfortunately little is 
known about Kurtz. His name is not usually mentioned in renditions of 
the Munich occupation. Niethammer ("Besatzungsmacht" 1 77), for 
example, simply lists Keller as the "MG commander" (MG-Chef). Kurtz 
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Lt. Col Kurtz, in command, is an able and cool headed officer, a 
good organizer and administrator, and with a clearer definition 
and a more general understanding of his authority by the local 
commanders and the German civil authorities .... [Kurtz] can be 
counted on to turn in an excellent performance. 
Kurtz's time in Munich was short, however: on September 27, 1945 he 
died as a result of an unusual accident. He was struck by a falling stone 
from the Rathaus.36 Thereupon Keller became Munich MG 
commander.37 Keller, an engineer by training, spoke German because of 
Alsatian ancestry and personally made many of the most important early 
Munich contacts and gave out most instructions.38 
Successful control of the largest city in the US Zone of Occupation 
demanded a special detachment. In Munich the internal problems 
between tactical and MG detachments do not appear to have posed as 
many problems as elsewhere. MG detachment officers reportedly had 
their specialized sections "well in hand," were "competent" and 
"experienced" officers who were given positions for which "they seemingly 
played an effective, yet "behind-the-scenes role," and left most 
"observable" tasks for assistant Keller to handle personally-- presumably 
due to Keller's language abilities -- giving the impression that Keller was 
the highest-ranking MG officer from the beginning (Boehling 360-61). 
36sayHStA OMGB(Y) CO I 445 I 1 1, Operations Report on Military 
Government Detachment No. F-213, SK Munich (hereafter: Op. Report), 
Dec. 19, 1945, 2; Chronik 67. 
37BayHStA OMGB(Y) COI4451 I 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 2. 
Maj. David R. Blossom became Keller's assistant. By then Keller and 
Blossom were the only original officers serving with the detachment; they 
were assigned to Munich MG on Sept. 18, 1944 (2). 
38soehling 360-61. 
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are best qualified." They were "ve:ry serious in their sense of responsibility 
and the necessity for finishing the job and not running out on it."39 
Nevertheless, MG reports do reveal some common dilemmas brought on 
by the many personnel changes and scarcities resulting from 
redeployment and MG reorganization.40 
Some of the greatest challenges to Munich MG lay in restoring the 
necessary city infrastructure -- communications, fire services, utilities, 
etc. -- crippled from years of bombing: 74 Allied bombing raids had struck 
Munich between 1940 and 1945, dropping 3,519,450 bombs ofvartous 
kinds. 6,632 persons were killed, 15,800 wounded. 300,000 residents were 
homeless, 81,500 dwellings destroyed. Ninety percent of the historic 
Altstadt was flattened. 41 Despite Munich's lack of industrial targets, the 
city's reputation as the well of Nazism made it a required target for Allied 
bombers.42 Untold amounts of rubble covered the city. Confronted with 
the chaos, the Munich MG's well qualified sections began to apply their 
specialized training with critical expediency, according to MG reports:43 
The first days of the occupation were extremely trying ones With 
everyone in Military Government striving to get his "feet on the 
ground" and create some measure of order out of the chaos and 
confusion which existed. Despite the chaotic conditions, [the 
39BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ I 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 2. 
40BayHStA OMGB[Y] 10/78-1/4, Munich detachment Annual 
Historical Report 1945/46 [hereafter: Munich AHR]), 3. 
41chronik 42-43. 
42ziemke, Army 253. 
43BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 2. 
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Munich MG detachment] began to function immediately .... a 
mess was quickly established, the operation of the message center 
commenced, .... the necessru:y proclamations were posted, 
control of the fire dept. (achieved} .... by the 8th of May the 
hydro-electric system was again functioning, public works and 
utilities was [sic] established, banks were closed, a displaced 
persons office was opened and on the 17th of May street car lines 
were again in partial operation .... 
In appointing Germans-- and practicing indirect rule-- Munich 
MG officers demonstrated a further pragmatism. MG, as elsewhere, had 
in this period the power to cause a permanent breach in the continuity 
of German institutions and "thereby to alter the fundamental conditions 
of German social and political life ... 44 The detachment, however, relied 
on "acceptable," competent, largely pre-1933 "established" figures. The 
Catholic church played a notable role in influencing early MG personnel 
decisions. Kurtz and Keller were both identified as "fanatically Catholic," 
and on Kurtz's initiative Keller immediately contacted the prominent 
Cardinal Michael Faulhaber for advice.45 
Better preparations and information allowed Munich MG to 
practice more stringent methods of Nazi "cleansing" than in many areas. 
Yet MG avoided the chance to implement profound changes. In this 
period Munich MG operated according to a prevalent two-step plan: MG 
only shut out the worst Nazis, to bide its time in finding suitable 
replacements. In this manner the true purging-- according to formulated 
goals of later "denazification" --was postponed46 so that the practical, 
44Krteger 56. 
45soehling 359. 
46Niethammer, "Entnaziflzierung 142. 
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pressing tasks of MG could be accomplished. Indeed, a rough 
"moratorium" existed more or less in most areas until July 1945: until 
full establishment of MG, reestablishment of local administration, and 
the implementation of the ban on political parties.47 By late summer the 
demands of the elaborate denazification apparatus began to take 
precedence over other matters. 
A brief look at a couple of the first German officials appointed 
reveals the "cautious" orientation. Upon arrival the first choice for 
Munich Oberbiirgermeister (henceforth OB) was not to be found. Keller 
thus appointed48 the first seemingly competent official he met in the 
Rathaus to temporarily assume the post of OB:49 Dr Franz Xavier 
Stadelmayer, a pre-1933 OB of nearby Wiirzburg, a member of the 
Bavarian People's Party (BVP), parallel in Bavaria to the Catholic Center 
party (Z). Stadelmayer had also become a member of the NSDAP, 
although not until 1944. Stadelmayer readily informed Keller of this; 
Keller made it clear he would only serve until a more suitable choice 
could be found.50 
47Niethammer, Entnazifizierung 142. The direct responsibility for 
denazification would eventually be handed over to the Germans-- to the 
relief of overworked MG officers; special denazification courts 
(Spruchkammer) were set up to handle the multitude of cases. 
48chronik 43. 
49wagner 156. 
50Boehling 359. Keller was impressed with Stadelmayer's 
administrative capabilities and knowledge of Munich conditions, and 
kept him on as Deputy Oberbiirgermeister, or 2. Biirgermeister (Boehling 
359). 
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This first choice for OB, Karl Scharnagl, was found soon thereafter 
and appointed OB on May 4.51 Scharnagl was a former Munich OB and 
BVP member. Schamagl, a baker by trade, had done time in Dachau, and 
because he feared last-minute retaliations spent the last weeks of the 
war in hiding. Scharnagl at first hesitated at Keller's request but Keller 
told him he would be well-assisted and supported by MG; in any case he 
could also force Scharnagl to take the post. 52 
Many ministers appointed by MG or Schamagl (with MG's 
blessing) were connected to the BVP and the Catholic Church. Unofficial 
MG advisor Cardinal Faulhaber definitely favored such appointments. 
Since a young age OB Scharnagl, for example, had been vecy active in 
Catholic groups. Furthermore, Scharnagl's brother was a bishop under 
the cardinal's jurisdiction. 53 
Many of the officials reinstated were of conservative, pre-1933 
orientation. Not all were affiliated with the Nazi party, but many were, 
and soon found themselves dismissed because of MG adherence to 
denazification directives. In Munich, careful denazification was practiced 
from the start. Each city employee reporting for duty was required to fill 
out a Fragebogen, the MG questionnaire on an individual's past and 
involvement with the Nazi party or related organizations. The 
questionnaires were screened by MG's Special Branch, which was 
51chronik 43. 
52soehling 360; Wagner 157-158. 
53Boehling 361. 
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responsible for denazification. The head of Munich Special Branch, 
Captain Kurt Baer, was a German Jewish emigre who, unlike many 
specialized MG officers, was first concerned with denazification, and 
second with appointing efficient personnel. 54 The number ofFragebogen 
became so great, however, that many were personnel were allowed to 
work temporarily until processing of the questionnaires was finished. 55 
This caused a minor gap in dismissals. Of the original 15 acting 
department heads appointed by OB Scharnagl, nine had to be removed by 
MG before the end of May. 56 
Despite the tendency to search out pre-1933 officials, there was 
more reinstatement of concentration camp victims and political 
persecutees in Munich than in other large US Zone cities: "Overall .... 
Munich seemed to have had a more progressive and representative 
municipal administration in 1945-46 than either Frankfurt or 
Stuttgart."57 In the first months Munich MG appeared to establish a 
natural balance between specific, pragmatic concerns and broader goals 






THE FLEETING ROLE OF THE FREIHEITS-AKTION BAYERN 
In the days before and after the capitulation the Freiheits-Aktion 
Bayem (literally: "Freedom Operation Bavaria") was able to create much 
confusion among remaining German defenders, aid the efforts of tactical 
troops, assist the CIC and facilitate the establishment of MG. 
Nevertheless, such groups claiming to be "Anti-Nazi" presented MG with 
a challenge. According to directives CSS 551 and JCS 1067, the "worst" 
Nazis -- high party members, SS men -- were to be expelled and in many 
cases imprisoned. How were groups of an "opposite" stance -- which MG 
did not expect -- to be controlled? The example below illustrates the 
limits in allowing Germans a role. 
The efforts of the Freiheits-Aktion Bayem (FAB) helped assure that 
US troops could take Munich without much resistance. 58 In the night of 
April27-28, 1945, an assorted group of civilian and militacy men 
attempted a goal they had coveted since Hitler came to power, with plans 
they had formulated for over a year: revolt throughout Southern Bavaria. 
Before the uprising began the FAB managed to channel a US and a 
French prisoner of war through Allied lines to inform Allied commanders 
of the impending rebellion, and to appeal for a stop to air 
bombardments. Further heavy bombings were canceled for this reason. 59 
The core of the FAB came from a Wehrmacht interpreter unit, 
Dolmetscherkompanie VII. Captain Dr GerngroB, Major Caracciola and 
58Bayerische Landeszeitung. Nachrichtenblatt der Allierten 12. 
Heeresgruppe fur die deutsche Zivilbevolkerung June 1, 1945, 1. 
59Boehling 357. 
46 
Major Braun from this unit led the FAB revou.60 In a statement of vague 
goals61 the FAB hoped for a union of all Nazi opposition. Indeed, for the 
revolt itself the F AB cooperated with the socialist group "07"62 as well as 
the monarchist group "Bayerische Freiheitsbewegung." The FAB and 
fellow groups rose up with varied success and failure around Munich and 
in most Landkreisen in Southern Bavarta.63 The FAB was reported very 
active in Miesbach, for example.64 
The FAB was able to create an amount of chaos among remaining 
German forces, and for about twelve hours assumed official powers. In 
the early morning hours, with support from a batallion belonging to the 
17th Panzerdivision, the F AB captured the main broadcasting stations in 
Erding and Freimann on the outskirts of Munich. From there they 
broadcasted the signal for the revolt to begin, 65 and members of the 
interpreter unit called upon foreign forced labor to "rise against the 
Nazis." Factory workers blocked some access roads to Munich from which 
SS reinforcements were expected. Railroad men brought trains to a halt. 
60chronik 41-42. 
61The FAB agenda in: Franz Obermaier, JosefMauerer, Aus 
Triimmern wachst das Neue Leben (Munich: Neue Miinchner Verlags-
Gmbh, 1949) 9ff. 
62Boehling 357. 
63Niethammer, En tnazifizierung 126-12 7. 
64BayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/142-1/7, MG Weekly, May 13-20, 1945. 
65: The signal was Fasanenjagd, or "pheasant hunt" -- wartime 
slang for the high-ranking Nazis was "pheasants." 
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FAB managed to capture and for a short time occupy some key party and 
municipal offices, including the Rathaus and the building housing the 
Nazi paper Volkischer Beobachter. 66 
FAB members searched out important local Nazis. In the Rathaus 
they took prisoner the powerful Parteigenosse, Ratsherr and 
Kreistagsprasident67 Christian Weber. Nevertheless, many targeted 
figures were not located. Significantly, Gauleiter Giesler was not present 
in his headquarters. He had fled Munich68 after entreating public 
officials to stay at their posts and threatening them with harsh 
punishment if they did not. Moreover, the leaders of the FAB failed to 
convince the leading Munich -area Nazi Reichstatthalter Ritter von Epp to 
begin immediate surrender negotiations with the Allies. 69 
66Bay. Landeszeitung June 1, 1945, 1. 
67parteigenosse =Party Member; Ratsherr =Councilman; 
Kreistagsprdsident =District Assembly President. 
68Boehling 357. 
69chronik 42. "Reichstatthalter" was a powerful position in the 
NSDAP of ambiguous and almost untranslatable meaning, commonly 
reserved for "Alte Kampfer" (Old Fighters) such as von Epp. 
Reichstatthalter, created in 1933, represented the central Reich 
Government (Reichsregierung) within the lands of the Greater German 
Reich (Deutsches Reich). The Reichstatthalter reported to the Reich Interior 
Ministcy, had the duty of making sure that the Fuhrer's policies were 
correctly followed~ and suggested proper candidates for the Fuhrer to 
appoint to the Land Governments (NS-Deutsch. "Selbstverstandliche" 
Begriffe und Schlagworter aus der Zeit der Nationalsozialismus, ed. Karl-
Heinz Brackmann and Renate Birkenmeier [Straelen: Straelener 
Manuskripte Verlag, 1988, 159]). (An MG report translates 
Reichstatthalter as "Land Director" (BayHStA OMGB(YJ 10/85-3/5, 
Weekly Military Government Report for Land Bavaria (hereafter: MGB 
Weekly}, May 21, 1945.), ironically the later, milder MG term for the 
commanding US Land governor. 
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Meanwhile, SS units were able to penetrate into the city. By the 
late aftemoon of April28 bloody skirmishes had ensued between FAB 
men and the SS troops. The FAB was not able to hold its positions. By 
5:00 p.m. on April 28 it was announced the revolt had been suppressed. 
Carriaccola was caught, immediately subjected to a court-martial, and 
executed. Other FAB leaders, including Dr GemgroB, suiVived.70 
The uprising revealed to MG that resistance did exist within 
Germany, yet MG and tactical troops had been instructed to make no 
distinction between common Germans and Nazis. The non-fraternization 
directive discouraged possible "collaboration." Moreover, in this early 
stage the only clear guidelines MG detachments had on appointing 
personnel were negative ones: no "Nazis, Nazi sympathizers and 
militarists" were to be given administrative positions. 71 
Initially, impressed MG and tactical officers allowed the F AB a 
significant role. In many outlying areas immediately before or after US 
troops entered, FAB or related activists installed themselves in top 
administrative posts, and the first US troops to arrive did not object. 72 
In Munich, General Harris of the CIC arrived and approached FAB 
leaders to offer them the chance to cooperate. Harris, who represented 
only the CIC, explained that general Munich MG goals were not his 
concern and used FAB men in finding and holding "dangerous" Nazis. 
70chronik 41-42; Bay. Landeszeitung June 1, 1945, 1. 
71 Boehling 341. 
72wagner 144. 
FAB men were given an office and were required to issue reports to the 
CIC, a task the FAB fulfilled zealously. 73 
49 
In a very short time the FAB seemed to become pivotal. It was 
suddenly attractive, and within days the FAB ranks grew rapidly. The 
office became overwhelmed with the task of registering and employing 
new members, and was a meeting place for deliberations among members 
of varied political orientation. The FAB post became an .. unofficial 
Rathaus;" MG and CIC initially allowed political discussion within the 
FAB ranks, although political organization of any kind was officially 
strictly forbidden.74 Munich MG approached the FAB for advice on 
suitable personalities for administrative posts.75 
Nevertheless, the FAB's purpose was dubious, its function short-
lived. It became clear that too many questionable characters and 
opportunists were flooding into the FAB offices. Munich FAB leaders had 
hoped to coordinate plans with groups which were quickly gathering 
strength and responsibilities in the rest of Southern Bavaria. Munich 
FAB leaders wanted to avoid any confusion of interests. The breakdown 
of communications, however, gave the Munich office little if no control 
over FAB activities outside ofMunich.76 MG, abiding by its own 
73wagner 155: Concerns over Nazi-guerrillas, above all the 
.. werewolves," influenced many early decisions involving military security. 
74Niethammer, Entnaziflzierung 129. According to the directives 
CSS 551 (Holborn 138) and JCS 1067 (Holborn 162 ), political 
association or activity was forbidden, unless MG "deemed otherwise." 
75wagner 156; 164-165. 
76wagner 165. 
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directives, did not allow telephone or messenger contact between the FAB 
headquarters and groups outside of Munich. MG became angered by 
actions it saw as opportunistic. FAB took it upon itself to distribute 
member identification cards implying official MG authorization, allow 
members to carry weapons, and assume entitlements of officials. 77 
In this early stage of the occupation, such rapid developments 
proved too hazardous for MG. It appears that MG simply did not trust an 
"anti-Nazi" organization so suddenly popular. The FAB was by far the 
most powerful of the three prominent movements, and MG considered 
such a group a clear refuge for opportunists with a past: "(the FABJ .... 
offers an admirable mechanism for infiltration by former NSDAP 
members either wishing to whitewash themswelves or to facilitate their 
accomplishment of whatever long-term mission they might have been 
assigned."78 
MG's empowerment of the FAB lasted only two weeks. On May 15, 
two CIC officers came to the FAB leaders, voiced harsh accusations and 
made it clear that the FAB's influence must be diminished. Two days 
later the officers returned to declare that, according to occupation 
directives organizations like the FAB had to cease operation. CIC men 
requisitioned the FAB files and closed the office.79 Regional MG of 
Bavaria ordered that all FAB officials everywhere had to stop activities 
77Niethammer, Entnazifizierung 130-131. 
78BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/85-3/5, MGB Weekly, May 21, 1945, 6. 
79wagner 165; Niethammer, Entnazifizierung 131. 
immediately.80 Regional MG considered the following the most 
prominent "unsanctioned activities" of the FAB:81 
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(1) Representation of itself as the sole organization sponsored by 
and sanctioned by Allied authorities, and as the sole and most 
effective channel of approach to American Military Government. 
(2) Granting by Gerngross to members of, or supporters of, his 
organization of laisser-passer allowing travel, relaxation of curfew 
restriction or firearms permits, without the concurrence of or 
reference to AMG. Those permits were issued on the letterhead of 
the FAB and signed by, or for, Gerngross. 
(3) Unauthorized requisition by members of the FAB of vehicles 
and buildings on their authority alone, representing themselves as 
supported in their actions by U.S. authorities. 
Whatever the official reasons, explanations and accusations 
regarding FAB exclusion abound. Rebecca Boehling (358) suggests that 
the FAB leaders' own decision to distance themselves from the CIC might 
have contributed to the ban. Interestingly, the influential Cardinal 
Faulhaber presumably played a role in the FAB's demise: the cardinal 
not only disliked FAB leader Dr GerngroB --because he was Protestant 
and married to a non-Bavarian-- but very likely "decreased MG's 
confidence in the FAB."82 At the same time-- curiously-- Cardinal 
Faulhaber, in a patriotic appeal, advised another FAB leader (and 
Protestant), Dr Ottoheinrich Leiling, not to work too closely with the 
Americans. 83 
80BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/85-3/5, MGB Weekly, May 28, 1945, 9. 
81BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/85-3/5, MGB Weekly, May 21, 1945, 6. 
82 Boehling 361. 
83Boehling 361. 
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By the end of May MG clarified the limits of local German 
initiative. On May 25 Munich MG announced that political parties, 
organisations, groups or anti-Nazi groups and organizations were not 
allowed to organize themselves, set up offices or hold gatherings of any 
kind. Furthermore, they were not empowered to confiscate vehicles, 
provisions or buildings. The distribution of posters, books, leaflets, and 
other printed materials was forbidden. Any activities had to cease 
immediately.84 Many Germans reportedly welcomed the move. Regional 
MG found the population "well satisfied" with Munich MG's decision to 
abolish all political organization: it was becoming "common knowledge 
that the FAB was a non-reputable group whose leaders wanted to 
establish themselves with Allied authorities to further their own 
opportunistic ambitions." Meanwhile, some FAB members themselves 
reportedly admitted that their organization was "getting out of hand."85 
In a presumably sudden understanding of what was to come, many 
in the FAB si~ply disappeared from the scene. The FAB and associated 
groups faded fast, the many questionable members even faster. On the 
outskirts of Munich and in the Southern Bavarian Landkreisen the 
situation was the same. This summary of the FAB illustrates a common 
fate:86 
In both the Mies bach and the Bad Aibling area the Freiheits Aktion 
Bayern was extremely active in the early days. During the Nazi 
84chronik 54. 
85BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/85-3/S,'MGB Weekly, May 28, 1945, 9. 
86BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/77-3/1 AHR Miesbach 2. 
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regime a few men formed the core. Its inspiration was historic 
Bavarian separatism and there does not seem to be in this area at 
least, any record of active opposition among these men to the 
NSDAP. In the last days of combat hundreds suddenly became 
F.A.B. [sic]: those who might have originally formed a real 
resistance movement were lost in the crowds of those climbing on 
a new band-wagon. Many saw in the German defeat hope for an 
independent Bavaria, many others hoped to hide their activity or 
lack of it, under the F.A.B. banner. Until the quality of members of 
the F.A.B. and their political aims became evident, the party had 
some influence and through Military Government officers, placed 
men in fairly important positions. As the true nature of the 
movement became clear, those who had nothing more then their 
F.A.B. association to recommend them, were replaced. Generally 
the great majority of F.A.B. was absorbed into the CSU. 
Regardless of internal problems, the somewhat dubious FAB was 
destined for a fleeting role. After all, MG directives forbade any political 
organization or cooperation. The cautious, strict Munich MG was much 
more evident than the lenient one. 
At the early stage of the occupation, MG preferred "indirect rule" 
but restrained German "ambitions." Discipline, not democratization was 
the goal. The preceding examples reveal how inconsistent this practice 
could be in the first months of the occupation. 
Although not without flaws, the effectual and well-trained Munich 
detachment provides a clear example of proper, capable Military 
Government. The Miesbach detachment, however, failed in some 
important areas. Still, it is difficult to fault the Miesbach MG officers 
given the impossible conditions and immense hurdles. For German 
groups like the FAB, the fate was even more direct and damning. 
CHAPTER IV 
DEFINING AUTHORITY AND ASSURING PUBLIC SAFETY 
The German defeat of May 1945 ended 12 years of a system that 
expressed itself most directly by strictly enforcing order and exercising 
complete control, or at least the widespread perception of it. US 
occupiers found it suddenly necessary to fill the immense void of 
contrived order by means as uncompromising and martial. Ambitious US 
aims required from the beginning the strictest information control and 
public safety policies for the goals to succeed at all. As any conquering 
occupation force must do, American occupiers were obligated to rule 
absolutely. 
As obligated ruler, MG held the prominent responsibility "to 
maintain and presetve law and order; and .... to restore normal 
conditions among the civilian population as soon as possible.'' 1 To 
maintain this law and order, or "public safety," MG was forced to assure 
a secure environment for local civilians while at the same time strictly 
con trolling them. 2 To eventually "allow" Germans to develop a fresh 
perception of order according to democratic ideals and eventually nurture 
1From CSS 551 in Holborn 137. 
2 Some issues relevant to law and order -- military security, 
intelligence, or political investigation, for example -- are worthy of a 
whole study themselves, and are not stressed in these pages. 
from this void a rejuvenated system, the US occupier's form of control 
would have to gradually assume a vezy different man!ler from those the 
of Nazi past. The example of MG reestablishment of the Munich and 
Bavarian police illustrates the challenges presented by creating and 
guiding a new, untainted authority from the infamous old. 
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According to the considerations above, this chapter explores frrst 
how MG clarified policy and assured a secure environment through strict 
measures and the "direction" of information, and second the reactivation 
and control of German police authority. 
CLARIFYING THE NEW ORDER 
Germany was a conquered enemy. Yet for MG to achieve the initial 
task of "getting things going again," a-- relatively-- stable atmosphere 
had to be established. MG, stated CSS 551, "Shall be firm .... [but) will 
at the same time be just and humane with the respect to the civilian 
population. "3 JCS 1067 nevertheless made it clear that circumstances 
were not yet ripe for many freedoms:4 
Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a 
defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy 
Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied 
objectives. 
Directly upon arrival, MG instituted a series of strict controls and 
measures that clarified this new relationship. Reasons were two-fold: 
3Holborn 136. 
4JCS 1067 in Holborn 159. 
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cautious militaty security and political requirements ("all Germans are 
Nazis") determined one. The need for law and order determined the other, 
and was presumably welcomed by German ciVilians. In the first months 
and after, there were many threats to public safety: plundering and 
widespread theft; murdering "robber bands;" and angcy, revengeful forced 
laborers. 
The rigid new order under MG was initially and not unexpectedly 
quite restrictive, yet loosened even after the first months. The strict anti-
fraternization law, for instance, was meant to assure distance between 
occupier and occupied Germans. It soon became clear that not all 
Germans were dangerous or Nazis, and the controversial ban was 
gradually toned down.5 Speaking in public with Germans was allowed by 
July 21,6 but was only "officially" lifted in the fall of 1945.7 
The many occupation laws and proclamations are far too 
numerous to list. The following brief rundown of immediate MG 
measures in Munich illustrates the environment. CiVilians -- of any 
nationality-- were kept inside by curfew from 7:00p.m. to 6:00a.m. 
Those found outside could expect a prison sentence. Evacuated persons 
5For reasons behind the indecisiveness regarding non-
fraternization policy, see Ziemke, Army 321-7. 
6chronik 64. 
7Munchner Zeitung. Alliertes Nachrichtenblatt (hereafter 
Miinchner), Sept. 22, 1945, 3. Of course, American Gls and Germans did 
speak to each other, regardless of regulations. In any case, neither 
marriages between American soldiers and German women nor the living 
of soldiers in German homes was yet allowed (Mii. Zeitung, Sept. 29 
1945, 2. 
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were not allowed to return to Munich, and those inside Munich were not 
allowed to leave, until further notice. Many main streets in the inner city 
remained closed and off limits, primarily to secure passage for military 
vehicles. Any vehicle found in these streets was immediately confiscated. 
Plunderers were warned of the strictest sentencing. The theft. or 
possession of US military property was highly forbidden, regardless of the 
source.B Correspondence or communications of any kind, even by 
messenger, were strictly forbidden. 9 Nevertheless, the ne\v regulations 
also meant the end of old ones. On May 1 the black-out regulations in 
effect since Sept. 3, 1939 -- lasting 2077 nights -- were lifted.1 0 
It is important to consider briefly how MG communicated policy, 
established its influence, and secured the environment. The Public Safety 
Branch of MG considered one of its major achievements "the formulation 
and execution of policy for the establishment and maintenance of law 
and order." 11 This task was naturally crucial, yet the news of significant 
MG policies had to readily reach the occupied. 
During the combat period, the Psychological Warfare Division of 
SHAEF (PWD/SHAEF) exercised the responsibility for "information 
8Bay. Landeszeitung, May 18 1945, 1. The curfew was lessened--
gradually -- over the following months. 
9wagner 154. Most communication had already been disrupted; 
postal services, for example, had stopped almost two weeks before the 
first American troops arrived (Wagner 154). 
1 Ochronik 51. 
11 BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10 I 65-1 I 5, Public Safety Branch Annual 
Report (hereafter PSBAR}, June 1946, 1. 
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control." The Information Control Division (ICD/USFET) replaced PWD 
with the disbandment of SHAEF in July, but without any noticeable 
change in policy.12 Press policy was clearly formulated and implemented. 
It involved three phases: 1) the ban of all German media; 2) the 
establishment of Allied information services and-- corresponding to 
denazification and democratization --an exact scrutiny of the German 
media; and 3) the gradual transfer of media operations to Germans, but 
under Allied controls. The short term policy goal was military, the long 
term political. 13 
How was the widespread clarification of MG accomplished, and law 
and order furthered, under the chaotic circumstances? In the initial 
occupation, the first two phases mentioned above were obvious. German 
media remained banned, and MG's ICD informed the occupied of the 
many proclamations and laws. As the American armies moved farther 
into Germany, the Publishing Operations Branch of the lCD distributed 
Mitteilungen ("Bulletins") for the German population. The main purpose 
of these were to: 1) make public all laws, proclamations, orders, and 
12Elisabeth Matz, Die Zeitungen der US-Armee fur die deutsche 
Bevolkerung (1944-46) (Munster: Verlag C. J. Fahle, 1969) 47. On Allied 
propaganda and press policy: Deutsche Presse seit 1945, ed. Harry Pross, 
(Bern: Scherz, 1965 ); Norbert Frei, Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik und 
deutsche Presse-tradition. Die Geschichte der Nachkriegszeitung 
Siidostkurier (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986); Hans Habe, Im Jahre Null: 
Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Presse (Munich: Verlag Kurt 
Desch, 1966); Harold Hurwitz, Die Stunde Null der deutschen Presse. Die 
amerikanische Pressepolitik in Deutschland 1945-49 (Cologne: [publisher 
n/a}, 1972); Larry Hartenian, "The Role of Media in Democratizing 
Germany: United States Occupation Policy 1945-49," Central European 
History, 20.2 (1987): 145-190. 
13Matz 20-21. 
other important information; 2) provide reports in local areas on how 
daily life should continue under MG; and 3) "stabilize" conditions, by 
curbing rumors through the release of exact information.l4 
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By the end of hostilities a more thorough brand of "newspaper" 
was developed, published by a central editorial staff, and provided to the 
German population. These combined official announcements with local 
sections, commentary, and world news. Nevertheless, the layout 
remained sparse, the approach stern. Despite objections from the 
editorial staff, an "engaging" character was to be avoided.15 It was too 
soon for this. General McClure, commander of lCD, made it clear that "It 
is PWD's policy not to entertain Germans." Moreover, he clarified, the 
Germans do not need to form their own opinions, they "have to be 
told.'' 16 
By the time US forces had reached Southern Bavaria, a more 
extensive form of occupation newspaper had been established, and 
allowed local MG to clarify its goals effectively. Munich had been without 
printed news since April 30, 1945, when the Miinchner Neueste 
Nachrichten halted its operations. On May 18, MG published the first 
Bayerische Landeszeitun~. It appeared only three times, reached a total 
circulation of 328,00, and ended its run on June 1. The Landeszeitun~ 
14Matz 31. 
15Matz 37-41. New for German readers was the clear distinction 
between news and commentary indicative of American media. This style 
of objective reporting was adapted by the renewed postwar German press. 
16Matz 43-44. 
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was followed by the Miinchner Zeitun~. which appeared weekly from June 
9 until the end of September, and achieved a circulation of 600,000.17 
The papers only appeared periodically, but contributed nevertheless to 
clearing up major information gaps and helped MG stabilize the local 
situation. In the section "Die Militiirregiemng gibt bekannt" ("Military 
Government announces"), for example, MG clarified policies, announced 
ordinances and regulations, and warned of punishments for threatening 
law and order. 
Still, the MG newspapers could only reach so many. The shortage 
of paper made it difficult to facilitate increased newspaper circtulation. 
Other methods were also used. Munich MG printed and distributed 
·posters stating regulations, prohibiting political organization, and so 
forth. By July, Munich's ICD officers were operating two sound trucks for · 
official announcements, and by August had made them available to the 
Public Safety section "for cases of special emergency:·18 
Another media form -- radio -- assisted MG greatly, but its 
significance has been mostly ignored. It is important to note that the 
number of functioning radios was incredibly high; in Bavaria there were 
at least a million. Apart from initial technical problems arising from 
17oagmar Wiedenhorn-Schnell, "Medlen an der Longe: Deutsche 
Lizenzpresse in Miinchen 1945-49," Triirrunerzeit in Miinchen. Kultur 
und Gesellschaft einer deutschen Gro13stadt im Aufbruch 1945-49, ed. 
Friedrich Prinz, (Munich: Beck, 1984) 252. The first postwar German-
owned newspaper in Munich, the Siiddeutsche Zeitun~, was licensed by 
MG on October 6, 1945. 
18BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR97. 
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devastation and plundering, broadcasting was the only official organ free 
from material and circulation hindrances in this period, 19 provided 
electrical power was available. 
By May 11, the lCD section was able to begin broadcasting from 
the badly damaged station of the former "Reichsender Miinchen."20 MG 
broadcasters, calling themselves "Radio Miinchen," began the first 
broadcast by issuing proclamations: "Hier ist Radio Miinchen, ein Sender 
der Militarregierung. Einwohner Miinchens! Die Militarregierung gibt 
bekannt, daj3 .... "21 At first the broadcasts ran only twice daily,22 one 
and a half hours long, but soon increased after a more suitable studio 
was found.23 Mayor Scharnagl was able to deliver a censored radio talk 
on May 12.24 Listeners found the Radio Miinchen schedule in the lCD 
newspapers. 
19,Rudiger Bolz, "Von Radio Miinchen zum Bayertschen 
Rundfunk," Triimmerzeit in Miinchen. Kultur und Gesellschaft etner 
deutschen GroBstadt im Aufbruch 1945-49, ed. Friedrich Prinz, (Munich: 
Beck, 1984) 240. 
20BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 97. This was the 
same station from which in the last days the FAB proclaimed its revolt 
and, after SS troops had regained it, Gauleiter Giesler issued his last 
proclamation (Bolz 240). 
21Bolz 240: "You're listening to Radio Munich, the Military 
Government broadcaster. Citizens of Munich! The Military Government 
announces that .... "(translation by this author). 
22chronik 50. 
23Bolz 241. 
24BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 97 
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REACTIVATING GERMAN POLICE AUTHORITY 
The examples of media, or "information control," illustrate how 
directly and comprehensively MG dominated German society. Such 
ardent and intensive practice of control had limits, however, even in 
police matters. In the early months of the occupation, military police and 
tactical troops were the ultimate guardians of law and order,25 but could 
not patrol indefinitely. 
The preference for indirect rule demanded that MG reestablish 
local German police as soon as possible, but under strict MG direction. 
The practical goal of MG's Public Safety Section --establishing law and 
order-- was not, even in the initial stage, divorced from wider political 
goals. Public Safety staff were responsible for "the purging, 
reorganization, and reactivation of the German police agencies," as well 
as "supervision and control" of these agencies "in accordance with 
Military Government requirements."26 Within a year MG had made 
significant strides towards these goals, but not without dilemmas. 
Developments in Munich during the first months of police reactivation 
illustrate the challenges and predicaments MG, and the German police, 
had to overcome. 
25As late as July of 1946 "all important incidents" were "reported 
instantaneously" to the Provost Marshall and to the Military Police 
Headquarters in Munich (BayHStA OMGB[Y] 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 
5). 
26BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBAR 1. For one of the few 
ample descriptions of police policy, see: Robert M. W. Kempner, "Police 
Administration," Governing 403-418. 
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Allied planners considered certain German police bodies -- in the 
same manner as military and para-military organizations-- to be 
thoroughly "Nazified." According to the occupation directives, MG was to 
"seize and preserve all records and plans of the German military 
organizations and of the Nazi Party, and of the Security, Criminal, and 
Ordinruy Police. "2 7 The police agencies most directly under Nazi party 
control-- the Reich Criminal Police (Reichskriminalpolizei) and the 
Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) -- were to be abolished. Not all police 
were to be disbanded initially. The standard criminal and ordinary police 
were only to be "purged of Nazi personnel and put to use under the 
control and supervision of the Military Government."28 
MG was to reactivate "acceptable" German police immediately -- in 
the service of, and under the control of, MG. General Eisenhower, in a 
directive outlining and elucidating guidelines for police authority, 
decreed the following: "in general German local police carry the 
responsibility for maintenance of law and order, subordinate to MG 
control."29 
Naturally, US troops and Military Police were available for support, 
especially in extreme conditions. Furthermore, army planners eventually 
developed the bold idea of maintaining an elite force of police-type 
27From CSS 551 in Holborn 137. The same decree, with slightly 
different wording, is in JCS 1067 (Holbom 161). 
28From JCS 1067, Holborn 163. 
29Bay. Landeszeitung, May 25, 1945, 2 (translation from 
"Griindsatze im Polizeiwesen" by this author). 
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occupation troops, the US Constabulaty, to "assist German Civilian 
Police where necessary in controlling disorder caused by marauding 
bands of lawless individuals and to cooperate with German Police in the 
general maintenance of law and order."30 Despite enthusiasm, a lack of 
resources and troops kept the US Constabulaty an impressive but 
relatively insignificant force. 31 
Regardless, US forces could not expect to provide policing 
indefinitely. In Munich, for example, the Public Safety Section 
complained about the lack of US troops available for security purposes, a 
"security troop problem" Munich MG was watching very closely. By 
December 1945 less than 1000 US soldiers made up the "occupational 
security force." As a response, in the same month a security brigade of 
the Yugoslav Army was ordered to Munich, and comparties of armed 
Polish soldiers carried out guard duty at certain installations.32 
As soon as capitulation appeared certain, Germans attempted to 
construct agencies for securing law and order. In areas in and near 
Munich, local Germans identifying themselves with the FAB or related 
anti-Nazi groups made themselves Biirgermeister and Police chiefs or 
were assigned the task by the local population. In most cases the first US 
30sayHStA OMGB(Y) 9 I 18-1 14, "Operational Procedure: US 
Constabulary, Militaty Government, and German Police Agencies, June 
12, 1946" (hereafter Op. Procedure). 
31ziemke, Army 339-341; Davis 166-174. 
32BayHStA OMGB(Y) COI4451 1, Op. Report, Dec. 1945, 3: The 
Yugoslavian brigade consisted of five companies of roughly 10,000 
"trained Army troops" of Yugoslavian nationality, directly commanded by 
their own General. 
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troops did not object, 33 presumably appreciating the assistance. Few of 
these initial eager attempts lasted. Most of these hopefuls were soon 
dismissed by MG on account of unacceptable past activities.34 
In Munich on April 30 -- the day the first US units entered the city 
-- local "anti-Nazis" attempted to form a type of auxiliazy police force. 
Members of the anti-Nazi group "07" (see chapter III) named one of their 
members, Willi WelBman, leader of a body they called the "Bayerische 
Hiifspoltzei" (Bavarian Auxiliazy Police). They began to recruit "policemen" 
and distribute identification cards. On the night of April 30 -- the night 
before the Munich MG detachment arrived -- WeiBmann appeared at the 
Rathaus to request MG blessing for his operation. American troops there 
put him off until the next day, when he could then take up his proposal 
with more responsible authorities. WeiBmann continued his operation 
nevertheless. In the printing room of the Volkischen Beobachter he and 
his men printed up leaflets warning against plundering and distributed 
them the next morning. 35 
Munich MG's response to such initiative was swift and decisive. 
On the same morning, on May 1, WeiBmann appeared again at the 
Rathaus. Recently arrived MG officers there had no time for WeiBmann, 
and quickly put an end to the activities of the "Bayerische Htifspolizei." 
MG forbade the leaflets and ordered WeiBmann's force to disband.36 
33wagner 144 




Munich MG asserted direct control over the police situation. MG 
officers were at this time searching for their own man to head an official 
police force, under the direction of MG's Public Safety Section.37 
Demonstrating the "pragmatism" indicative of the early phase of the 
occupation, MG sought a competent, yet seemingly acceptable candidate 
active before 1933. On the afternoon of May 1, MG commander Kurtz's 
assistant Major Keller sent two of his officers to the Bogenhausen 
section of Munich in search of MG's first choice for Police Chief. The 
men had orders to locate the 71- year-old former Chief of the Bayerische 
Landespolizei (Bavarian State Police), Hans Ritter von Seisser.38 Seisser 
had played a decisive role in the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch of 
November 9, 1923. Seisser, as head of the Munich police 
(Polizeipriisident), ordered the suppression of the revolt. 39 
Seisser was brought to Major Keller, who asked him to take the 
office of Police Chief. Seisser accepted, then changed his mind. He 
claimed he would be too busy with his manufacturing business. Twenty-
four hours later. Keller and Seisser met again. This time Keller demanded 
he take the post, and reminded him he could be forced to take it. Seisser 
37MG records unfortunately report little about the officers of the 
Munich Detachment Public Safety Section. A roster of the detachment 
. for December 1945 (BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 
1945, 7) lists four Public Safety Section officers: Maj. Frank C. Smith 
(date joined detachment n/a); Capt. Gerald Greene Uoined detachment 
Aug. 16, 1945); Maj. Clarence A. Brown (joined detachment Apr. 14, 
1945); and Capt. William G. O'Brien (joined detachment June 28, 1945). 
38obermaier, and Mauerer 30. 
39Bay. Landeszeitung, May 25, 1945, 2. 
conceded, but under the condition that he receive no salary or 
compensation.40 On May 7 Seisser was officially named Police Chief.41 
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Not surprisingly, the first days of police reestablishment in Munich 
were difficult. The demands of war had already ravaged the ranks of the 
Munich department: 263 officials lost their lives, and 52 were reported 
missing; 1 7 4 police reserves were killed, 97 reported missing, and 1, 000 
were in various prisoner-of-war camps in 1945.42 Upon the arrival of US 
troops, the Criminal Police were suspended. Uniformed patrolmen 
( Schutzpolizel -- literally: Protection Police) were either in custody or 
remained in their homes untouched. Policemen with much to hide had 
fled long ago to the country or beyond. Precincts and station houses were 
mostly closed up or abandoned.43 
The situation soon changed under Seisser and the Public Safety 
Section's direction. On May 7 Munich police personnel comprised only 
100 patrolmen and 125 criminal police. Screening and "vetting" of 
personnel continued daily, yet at the same time concerted efforts were 
made to recruit new policemen. Remarkably, by the end of the month, 
MG reckoned the number of total police employees to have reached an 
amazing 3,700.44 Seisser appeared to receive full MG support, and 
40obermaier, and Mauerer 30-31. The reasons for this request are 
unclear, but were presumably altruistic. 
41BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 44. 
42suddeutsche, December 7, 1945, 3. 
43obermaier, and Mauerer 31. 
44BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 44. 
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cooperation seemed successful. Evecy morning meetings between Public 
Safety Branch officers and Munich pollee were held to discuss the events 
of the last 24 hours, as well as future measures.45 
Despite this apparent rebirth of the Munich police, the situation 
soon changed. Finding "acceptable" police personnel became the most 
significant problem. As mentioned, MG efforts to reestablish local 
German administration were marked by dilemmas. MG was to initiate 
plans but dominate affairs as little as possible. Nevertheless, figures with 
a connection to the Nazi party had to be shut out, at first according to a 
combination of MG judgment and useful CIC intelligence information. 
The early emphasis on efficiency, especially before the July directive, 
caused various specialized sections of MG to apply denazification 
irregularly. 46 
The Munich MG Public Safety Section prematurely reported in late 
May that "the de-nazification of the present police force is approximately 
two- thirds over and proceeding as quickly as conditions permit. "4 7 In 
fact, the authentic purge was yet to come. With more thorough 
formulation of denazification policy, the recruitment of suitable 
personnel became even more problematic. With the MG directive of July 
7, 1945, a clear-cut denazification policy was set in motion. Categories of 
45obermaier, and Mauerer 55. Seisser reportedly appreciated the 
proficiency of what he considered well trained and organized Public 
Safety officers (55}. 
46Ntethammer, Entnazifizierung 147-50. 
47BayHStA OMGB(Y}10/85-3/5, Weekly MG Munich, May 13-20, 
1945. 
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Germans to be denazified, and released from positions, were introduced. 
Included in the frrst categocy, those who were to receive mandatory 
dismissal, were all ordinacy police officials from the top down to 
lieutenant, regardless of Nazi party membership.48 Already before July, 
Munich MG began to apply a more strict and comprehensive 
denazification. On June 16 MG announced that all municipal officials 
(Beamte), employees (Angestellte), and workers (Arbeiter) who had joined 
the Nazi party or associated organizations before Januruy 30, 1933, 
would immediately lose their positions.49 
In June the police denazification was begun anew. MG Public 
Safety acted to suspend and purge the entire police department, with the 
goal of establishing "from the ground up an efficient and thoroughly 
denazified Police Department. "50 A gap in Fragebogen processing --
discussed in the previous chapter-- might partially explain why MG 
Public Safety waited as long as it did to act, and allowed the police 
department to expand in May. Regardless, MG reports for June cite a 
specific reason for prompting the action: extensive Nazi party 
membership records were discovered, 51 revealing that most of the police 
personnel were somehow affiliated to the Nazi party. 52 The entire 
48Niethammer, Entnaziflzierung 153. 
49chronik 58. 
50BayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/142-1/7, MG Weekly, June 3-10, 1945. 
51BayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/142-1/7, MG Weekly, June 3-10, 1945. 
52BayHStA OMGB(Y) CO/ 451/2, Op. Report, July 8, 1945, 29. 
department was officially suspended on June 5, 1945, and a minimal 
staff was kept on to take care of administrative tasks. 53 
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A few officials cleared by investigation were appointed to serve as 
the basis for a new force. 54 Police President Seisser was one of those few 
officials. He managed to last in his post until MG dismissed him in mid-
August. The causes for this are not entirely clear. The only brief account 
of Seisser's dismissal states that, despite his role in the Beer Hall 
Putsch, MG discovered that in the last years of the Weimar Republic 
Seisser had gotten too close to the increasingly influential Nazi party. 55 
In any case, an outside MG observer reported in July that although "not 
a Nazi (Seisser] is not aggressive and his removal is being considered ... 55 
Seisser might have lasted so long only because it took weeks of 
negotiations and consideration before the new candidate could be 
persuaded to take the police chief post. 57 As Seisser's successor MG 
appointed a more satisfactocy choice; one With no conceivable 
connection to the Nazi party: Franz Xavier Pitzer, 58, a Catholic, and 
SPD member from 1903 until 1933. Pitzer was a trained craftsman and 
carpenter, and a union member. In 1918-19 he organized the Bavarian 
53sayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/142-1/7, MG Weekly, June 3-10, 1945. 
54sayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 45. 
55soehling 376. Curiously, the pages in Chronik (47, 50) Boehling 
quoted for this information deal With events of May -- Seisser's 
appointment, for example -- and include no mention of Seisser's 
dismissal whatsoever. 
56BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/451/2, Op. Report, July 8, 1945, 29. 
57It is unclear whether Seisser knew of these developments. 
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Military Police and seiVed as assistant police chief (Vizeprdsident) under 
the Independent Socialist Staimer. Thereafter, Pitzer decided to quit 
rather than serve under the reactionary Police President Pohner. He 
withdrew to civilian life after 1919.58 
Pitzer assumed the post on Aug. 16, 1945.59 It appears MG wanted 
to show off the new appointment -- and department -- to its Miinchner. 
In a notable piece of "information control," a long, flattering article in 
the sober MG Miinchner Zeitun2 introduced Pitzer. Pitzer's first quoted 
comments were reported as follows: "The policeman comes from the 
people, and is there for the people; he must be the best friend of the 
people."60 
MG's new man Pitzer seemed a more acceptable appointee, and 
lasted in his office for a good time. There is an ironic note to all this, 
however: later, in 1949, MG would advise then OB Wimmer to dismiss 
Pitzer. A MG report found the Munich police the worst organized and 
managed force in all of Bavaria, and blamed Pitzer for having not the 
slightest elementacy understanding of police administration.61 
Furthermore, Pitzer -- known as a stalwart opponent of the burgeoning 
58Munchner, August 25, 1945, 3. 
59chronik 69. 
60Munchner, August 25, 1945, 3 (this author's translation): "Der 
Polizist kommt aus dem Volk, under ist dajiir das Volk; er muj3 der beste 
Freund des Volkes sein." 
61Hans Wacker, "Miinchner Kommunalpolitik nach 1945: 
NachlaBverwaltung oder demokratische Erneuerung?," Triimmerzeit in 
Miinchen. Kultur und Gesellschaft einer deutschen GroBstadt im 
Aufbruch 1945-49, ed. Friedrich Prinz, (Munich: Beck, 1984) 56. 
black market -- was himself found to be involved in "illegal 
transactions. "62 
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Constant reorganization of the Munich police continued 
throughout 1945. In June it appeared the department was less of a factor 
in the maintenance of law and order than at the end of hostilities. As 
mentioned, on June 5 the entire department was suspended. On June 11 
MG officially ordered a department reorganization, and in the days 
thereafter the number of officials grew, but only slowly. On June 12, 8 
detectives (Krtminalpolizei) were on duty; by June 22 there were 22. In 
normal times there were normally 300 detectives on duty in Munich.63 
By June 20 police precincts recommenced operation, but only to a 
limited extent. 64 
Reorganization did progress. At any rate, the ability of Munich 
policemen to act independent of MG was limited at this early stage. 
General Eisenhower's aforementioned directive decreed that German 
police were to be disarmed and remain that way; only for special 
emergency cases could certain groups be equipped with small arms and 
strictly limited ammunition. 65 Early on Police Chief Seisser had 
62Julia~e Wetzel, '"Mir szeinen doh:' Miinchen und Umgebung als 
Zuflucht von Uberlebenden des Holocaust 1945-48," Von Stalin2rad zur 
Wahrungsreform: Znr Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland, 
eds. Martin Brozsat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1988) 356. 
63obermaier, and Mauerer 55. 
64chronik 59. Registration desks (Meldestellen) were only open 8 
am- 12 pm Monday through Saturday (Miinchner, June 23, 1945, 2}. 
65say. Landeszeitung, March 25, 1945, 2. 
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requested arms as well as uniforms for his men; he was told that arms 
were neither authorized nor available.66 In this period the police carried 
only truncheons, which had little effect against armed plunderers and 
marauders. 67 Lack of proper equipment was naturally a constant 
problem. Under MG regulations, former uniforms had to be dyed and 
altered to avoid any resemblance to militaristic Nazi era uniforms. 68 
Funding was an initial problem. Between May and June many officials 
went weeks without any pay.69 
Munich police remained under close MG guidance, and were only 
gradually, after proving themselves, given full responsibility to carry out 
their work. The following MG report excerpt illustrates this: 70 
German police were detailed to foot traffic duty, working with 
Military Police. It was planned, that ·at such time as they were 
deemed fit to assume their independent duties without the aid of 
MP's they would be put on independent duty, and another group of 
civilian policemen would be detailed with the Military Police. 
Certain matters remained under the jurisdiction of Military Police. The 
detention and imprisonment of Displaced Persons (DPs), for example, 
was forbidden to German police. The Allied Powers had declared DPs 
United Nations nationals. Whenever German Police arrested DPs, they 
66BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 44. 
67wacker 55. 
68BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 44. 
69obermaier, and Mauerer 55. MG eventually obtained· police 
funds from the Staatsbank (55), but the funding troubles continued. 
70BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 47. 
were required to immediately tum them over to US authorities, provide 
arrest reports, and report the arrest to MG.71 
74 
It was difficult to find men for the police at this stage because of 
their abject rewards and reputation, as well as the fact that a 
satisfactory Fragebogen was required. 72 Under these conditions the 
Public Safety section felt it necessary to start a recruiting drive, 
intensified by radio broadcasts and newspaper appeals. This appears to 
have contributed to somewhat rapid growth. By August the total number 
of employees had reached 1 ,039, broken down in the following groups; 
711 patrolmen, 125 detectives, 170 administrators and 35 housekeeping 
personnel. 73 
Reinstatements also contributed to the notable rise in personnel, 
but the buildup was inconsistent. During the first week of September, for · 
example, "28 men were discharged, 240 were reinstated and 280 
applications for employment were rejected." MG managed to maintain 
police numbers by constant shuffling of police personnel from one 
capacity to another.74 The following chart from MG documents 
illustrates police growth from August until October 1945:75 
71BayHStA OMGB(Y) 9/18-1/4, "Op. Procedure," June 12, 1946. 
72obermaier, and Mauerer 54. 
73BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 47. 
74BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 48. 
75BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 51. 

























By December 1945 reorganization and purging resulted in the folloWing 
totals: 172 administrative officials , 155 criminal police and 421 
patrolmen had been dismissed. New appointments included 122 
administrative officials, 75 criminal police, and 555 patrolmen. Almost 
Without exception the new appointments were native Bavarians, from all 
walks of life. 76 Personnel instability certainly did not end in 1945. Many 
future aspirants proved "unacceptable" because of their pasts, and others 
unsuitable for police work. 
Meanwhile, other problems of police reorganization were being 
slowly, partially resolved. Arming of the police was permitted in the fall. 
In negotiations With MG, municipal authorities made a concerted effort 
to convince MG of the necessity for arms. 77 This contributed to MG's 
decision, but the Public Safety Branch was reaching the same conclusion 
on its own. An August 1945 report determined that the "arming of the 
police remained the major problem .... unarmed men cannot be 
expected to rest- behind the protection of a uniform or police card. "78 
76suddeutsche, December 7, 1945, 3. 
77wacker 55. 
78BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1 I 4, Munich AHR 48. 
76 
By Januacy 1946, Munich MG considered its initial rebuilding of 
the Munich Police Department largely over. There were still many 
problems to be solved-- reports indicate a lack of sufficient funding, for 
example.79 Still, MG Public Safety proudly judged its efforts successful. 
The following MG report passage summarizes Munich MG's 
assessments:80 
The Munich Police Department had almost completed its 
reorganization and was considered to be one of the finest in the 
American Zone. The Uniformed Police are completely dressed in the 
new uniform of Royal Blue and Black trimmed with Silver Grey, 
and are equipped with breast shields of American design. The 
Police are armed with carbines and pistols of Italian make. There 
were, as of yet, not enough weapons to arm all the Police 
individually. Another handicap was the lack of sufficient vehicles 
in good condition to establish road patrols. At this time no motor 
patrols were in action. Telephone and teletype remained the 
principal means of communication. Radio transmitter was 
available, however, Radios for police cars had been requested but, 
as yet no action had been taken in this matter. 
In December 1945 an outside MG observer judged the situation not as 
favorably:81 
.... [the Munich police force], as now constituted, consists of 
2,200 men and their efficiency is believed to be rapidly improving 
due to the continuous training on the job and the selection of 
most efficient personnel. It is reported that they need additional 
supply of small arms. Also, the Det has been unable to secure 
sufficient uniforms due to hold-up of material by the freeze at 
79BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10 I 78-1 I 4, Munich AHR 51. 
80BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10178-114, Munich AHR 52. In an effort to 
avoid militaristic connotation, the uniforms were designed after the 
American example: the tunics had a much looser cut, rank was displayed 
on the arms instead of on the shoulders, and the peaked cap introduced 
(Miinchner, July 28, 1945, 2 ). 
81BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 2. 
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Third Army Hq. They report the Police Force has only 319 uniforms 
out of 1,410 required. They also require 1,100 overcoats. 
Moreover, Munich MG reported to this source that "The efforts of the Det 
[sic] are practically exhausted to obtain supplies for local police."82 The 
attention to equipment concerns reveal how MG was burdened with 
many problems in addition to the demands of carrying out denazification 
directives. 
It would take much more than American-style police blues or 
police car radios to turn the German police into a capable force. Still, by 
the spring of 1946 MG already considered many of its direct goals largely 
fulfilled. MG began to "adVise," instead of "direct," a German police force 
gradually more independent of MG. The new German police would not 
operate under the sort of structure-- and jurisdiction-- it had before or 
during the Third Reich. A broader occupation goal was in play at this 
time, a product of the wish for not only a denazified but also a 
democratized Germany reformed "from the ground up." A series of 
directives stated how this applied to police reconstruction. General 
Eisenhower's guidelines for police authority emphasized that the police 
force was to be decentralized and rebuilt regionally and locally, as a 
component of local laws and administration. 83 A significant MG 
directive of July 7, 1945 further formulated this line as well as the 
decrees ofCSS 551 and JCS 1067. Organizational guidelines for the 
police were essentially finalized in MG regulations of February 1, 1946.84 
82BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 2. 
83Bay. Landeszeitung, May 25, 1945, 2. 
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Before 1933, German police agencies had been largely subordinate 
only to each state's Interior Ministry (Innenministerium). During the Third 
Reich the police became more and more centralized under 
Gleichschaltung, the practice of forcing or bringing all agencies in line 
under Nazi party authority. In Bavaria, this process began in 1935 when 
the Landpolizei (Provincial, or State Police; responsible for the state of 
Bavaria as a whole) was made subordinate to the Reich. Since 1933 
preparations had been made to incorporate the Landpolizei into the 
Reichswehr (the German Army from 1921-1935). The Criminal 
Investigations Police (Kriminalpolizei) and the Border Police (Grenzpolizel) 
were also centralized. In 1936 all police authority was made the 
responsibility of the Reich Interior Ministry. Rural police remained, but 
in practice were highly controlled by the consolidated police agencies85 
Decentralization under MG intended to create an organizational 
structure of police authority modeled on the American and English 
example. Jurisdiction and local responsibility were to be clearly defined. 
The goal was to create a situation whereby, as the Public Safety Branch 
described, "The police are subject to the will of the people instead of 
being used to enforce the will of the state upon the people. "86 
84Handbuch der bayertschen Amter. Gemeinden und Gerichte 
1799-1980, ed. Wilhelm Volkert, (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1983) 54: The directive's title was "Administration 
of Military Government in the US Zone" (see also chapter II). 
85Handbuch 53; Kempner, Governing 403-406. 
86BayHStA OMGB(Y} 10/65-1/5, PSBAR 1. Due to largely political 
and financial constraints, the German police gradually became more 
centralized than originally planned (Kempner, Governing 411-418). 
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Municipal police were put under the authority of the Mayor 
(Oberbiirgermeister). He was required to establish a unified city police 
force which was headed by a chief of police and functioned within the 
city as a unit of municipal administration. Each mayor had the total 
administrative responsibility for the municipal police and exercised full 
control over property, facilities, and suitable personnet87 
In Munich this new structure was novel. Since 1898 Munich 
municipal police headquarters (Polizeidlrektion or Polizelpriisidium) was 
under Bavarian state control. 88 As part of its reorganization plans, 
Munich MG ordered the police to be integrated back into the municipal 
administration. Incidentally, the City Council (Stadtrat) gratefully 
received this chance to control municipal police authority. In the Weimar 
period, the city had felt it had to contribute too much to state police 
funding; at the same time it was constantly unsatisfied with municipal 
police performance and procedure.89 
Cities of less than five thousand citizens were permitted to 
organize a police department. These local community police 
(Gemeindepolizei) were under the command of either the local ciVilian 
councilor (Gemeinderat) or mayor. If a department was not created, the 
local civilian governmental head could arrange With the Minister of the 
Interior for policing}rom the ranks of the Landpolizei. If created, this 
87BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBAR 2. 
88Handbuch 51. Between 1923 and 1929 many large Bavarian 
cities adopted this example. 
89wacker 55. 
form of police force was to have full authority throughout the county 
(Landkreis) in which they resided. In actual practice they would not go 
out of the city or community in which they were located unless they 
received a special request from the Landpolizei. 90 
80 
On the state (Land) level, MG reorganized the Landpolizei so that 
there was a Landpolizei headquarters in each Landkreis. The Landpolizei 
were allowed full jurisdiction throughout the state in which they 
operated. The Landpolizel were to assist the city police only in special 
cases; when requested to do so by the chief civilian governmental 
authority or by the Minister of the Interior.91 Correspondingly, MG 
ordered that the Landpolizei be under the command of the Ministty of the 
Interior. 92 
At the end of July 1945, MG named Michael Freiherr von Godin as 
the first head of the Landpolizei. Interestingly, Godin also had a decisive 
part in foiling the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. Godin, then a police 
lieutenant, was at the head of a group of initially only 33 policemen 
facing 2,000 armed Nazi putschists.93 When Hitler came into power the 
Gestapo put a death sentence on Godin. He was forced to flee to 
Switzerland where he continued to actively oppose the Nazi regime. MG 
called him back from Switzerland to take the post.94 
90BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBAR2; Handbuch 55. 




MG stressed the reestablishment of Border Police. Initially, Border 
Police were to cooperate with US tactical troops in controlling the 
international boundaries of Germany. During the period from October 
1945 to Februacy 1946 a foundation for this organization was created, 
and MG instructed the Minister President of Bavaria to give "special 
attention and high priority" to the organization of the Border 
authorities.95 The November 15, 1945 ordinance of the Bavarian 
Ministcy of the Interior reestablished the Border Police as an official 
component of the Ministry of the Interior. 96 MG hoped to involve 
German authorities as soon as possible in the efforts to solidify the long 
Bavarian borders of the US Zone of occupation. 
By the fall of 1945, US MG exercised complete control of the 
German population. MG strictly manipulated the media and police 
authority, two fundamentals of assuring law and order. That turned out 
to be the easy part under the circumstances. The hard part would come 
as MG attempted to guide Germans towards asserting a degree of local 
law and order themselves. As the next chapter reveals, challenging and 
peculiar crime problems severely complicated this process for MG and 
German authorities alike. 
94Munchner, July 28, 1945, 2. 
95BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBAR 3. 
96Handbuch 57. 
CHAPTER V 
LAW AND ORDER ISSUES 
In the early period of the occupation, "political" law and order 
among Germans was secured. The dreaded "werewolves" and other forms 
of resistance or anarchy never posed a clear threat. MG for Bavaria 
satisfactorily reported in July 1945 that the German population in the 
American Zone was generally orderly and obediant, and there were no 
significant disturbances. I German POWs caused MG few problems. In 
January 1946, Munich MG declared that "There was no indication of any 
organized German resistance to any American authority .... and there 
was [sic] no indications of any trouble with ex-Wehrmacht men."2 
Although there was very little political disorder, there was 
widespread criminal disorder. Criminal issues and dilemmas were fueled 
by the extreme chaos, destruction, and powerlessness brought on by a 
brutal war. Local crimes that were illegal under both MG mandates and 
lgtd. in Niethammer, Entnaziflzierung 137. Citing reasons behind 
the lack of resistance, the German historian Lutz Niethammer 
(Entnaziflzierung 137) points to consistent apathy among the bulk of the 
German population during the early occupation. See also: Ziemke, Army 
354-355. 
2BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1 I 4, Munich AHR 51. Since returning 
Wehrmacht POWs posed little threat their situation will not be 
considered in these pages. 
applicable German laws were also characteristic of crime problems 
throughout the US Zone.3 
83 
Certain groups of Displaced Persons posed great and innumerable 
challenges to law and order. They were liberated persecutees, yet 
suddenly became criminal offenders. This problematic status made their 
control a major issue for both MG and German authorities. 
MG's decisiveness as military "ruler" helped to keep the problems 
in check. The relative security of much of the population in Southern 
Bavaria was generally assured, 4 and order maintained. Still, even the 
threat of widespread criminal issues severely challenged the proper 
administration of the occupation. The issues were formidable, remained 
significant. and constitued only the first hurdles. As the German 
authorities became increasingly independent, they found themselves 
having to face an abundance of similar problems in the later occupation 
period. 
3For brief examination of crime issues and the rural situation, see 
Paul Erker, "Revolution des Dorfes? Landliche Bevolkerung zwischen 
Fliichtlingsstrom und Landwirtschaftlichem Strukturwandel," Von 
Stalingrad zur Wahrungreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in 
Deutschland, Ed. Martin Brozsat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans 
Woller, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988) 367-425. Naturally, US Army 




CAPITULATION, CHAOS, AND CRIME 
Plundering was a major issue in the chaotic early days of the 
occupation. Occupation historian Earl F. Ziemke notes that "Since the 
US troops, German civilians, and DPs all looted, there was some debate 
over whose behavior was the most reprehensible."5 Americans could 
argue they had only done what armies had rightfully done for centuries. 
DPs could justify that they were only taking what they needed to get by. 
By stealing from each other, Germans had the weakest defense, yet most 
Germans looted only very early on and in many cases returned what they 
had lifted after MG pressure.6 
Looters faced the harshest penalties in the waning Third Reich. In 
Munich on February 16, 1945, for example, a 26-year-old woman was 
sentenced to death for plundering committed after an Allied bombing 
attack. Nevertheless, widespread plundering began well before the 
capitulation. 7 Events signifying the sure end of Nazi authority 
encouraged plunderers. At about the time of the FAB revolt on April28, 
plundering broke out in almost all areas ofMunich.s 
The first plunderings involved all sorts of individuals, groups, 






guard the Filhrerbau (Fuhrer Building) and the Nazi party administrative 
building decided to flee. Unexpectedly, the guards left both buildings on 
the Konigplatz undamaged. In the air raid cellar of the Fiihrerbau and 
connected passages the SS men left behind a collection of art "procured" 
during the years of triumph: 259 paintings from Dutch masters of the 
seventeenth century, from Parts; and 350 paintings intended for a future 
Hitler collection (Hitler-Sammlung) in Linz. Surprtzed looters snatched 
up the unexpected bounty.9 Many of these works were later recovered, 
however. In December 1945 Munich MG issued radio and press notices to 
the public offering amnesty for the return of such objects. The plan 
proved "so successful" that MG extended it to include illegal possession 
of any looted art objects ("removed from any repository"), and lengthened 
the time for the return of such objects-- or the offer of information --to 
March 1, 1946.10 
The looters storming these cardinal Nazi centers were not looking 
for art, or necessarily revenge. These suddenly fearless first bands 
consisted of all types: deprived forced laborers, normally proper small 
9obermaier, and Mauerer 19-20. "Kunst-Sondeifiihrer" (Special Art 
Authority) Goering bought the Dutch paintings in 1942-43 from the 
Vichy government (19). 
10BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1 I 3 Munich MG Monthly Historical 
Report (hereafter: MG Monthly) for January, 1946, 26: "The clause 
referring to amnesty has been strengthened to further assure the people 
that no action of any kind will be taken against them for the return of 
art works or for information regarding such works. This office received 
commendation from higher headquarters for instigating the action above. 
Approximately 35 paintings of great value have so far been recovered as 
well as other art objects." 
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businessmen, bourgeois professionals and simple housekeepers. II They 
were hardened by countless bombings, motivated by envy and hunger, 
and fearful of future famine and crisis. 
Provisions in storage were the main targets. Munich had long been 
the most important storage and transfer center in Southern Bavaria. 
Warehouses and cellars were stuffed with goods off-limits to, but 
ingrained in the consciousness of locals and forced laborers allke.l2 
Wehrmacht storehouses and rations depots were the first to be ravaged. 
Beer cellars, department stores, customs terminals, warehouses, even 
apartments known to be well-stocked were then raided. Munich's 
Biirgerbriiukeller, for example, established as the "Relchstellejilr Fette und 
Kase" (Reich Depot for Fat and Cheese), was thoroughly pillaged of huge 
cheese and butter stocks. Less sensible but popular were the plunderings 
of wine cellars. Long lines of raiders waited with buckets and containers 
to get a chance at securing themselves free wine from the kegs or 
expensive bottles in storage. 13 Since records of provisions were poorly 
kept near the end of hostilities, it is difficult to estimate the extent of 
the first massive plunderings. In any case, most large reserves were 
pillaged until nearly empty. Much was simply destroyed under trampling 
feet or in the fray.l4 
Ilobermaier, and Mauerer 20. 
12obermaier, and Mauerer 27. 
13obermaier, and Mauerer 28. 
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The looting grew more and more extreme. Injuries and deaths 
increased as the stocks decreased. In the Lowenbriiukeller on May 3, two 
people were crushed by stampeding feet.15 In the Arzbergerkeller on May 
5, a woman was beaten to death by a fellow bottle-wielding plunderer.16 
When bolder criminals realized the larger stocks were running out, they 
began-- presumably in a miXture of desparation and confidence-- to hit 
smaller shops and businesses. Many plunderers began arming 
themselves, and attempts to stop them were few.1 7 
Munich MG, the sudden sole protector of law and order, did not 
act immediately against the looting. Extensive, and obvious plundering 
continued at least 10 days after MG arrived18 and had begun to address 
other pressing problems at once. It is difficult to establish firm reasons 
for the delay, but some factors are clear. MG promptly announced the 
earliest curfew on May 1,19 put many plunderers initially disobeyed u.20 
Looters carried their goods openly through main streets, under the eyes 
of idle MG officers. 21 US soldiers reportedly allowed much of the early 
14obermaier, and Mauerer 38. Obermaier, and Mauerer (38) 
presume that near the end of the war many depot keepers avoided precise 
inventories because they themselves were skimming from the stocks. 
15chronik 43. 
16chronik 44. 
17obermaier, and Mauerer 31. 
18obermaier, and Mauerer 37. 
19chronik 43. 
20obermaier, and Mauerer 27. 
looting to run their course; they stood by watching the spectacle and 
regarded the pillaging throngs favorably.22 
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Although looting by American soldiers was not universal, there was 
a great deal of it. Many Gls reckoned that after the horrors and 
hardships they had endured they deserved their plunder.23 From the 
sources at hand it appears that plundering by Gls was less prevalent in 
Munich than in areas with less scrupulous or effective MG detachments. 
Still, American authorities of all sorts looted in all areas. The practice 
quickly became an orchestrated art form:24 
Soldiers stationed themselves outside militacy government offices 
and intercepted civilians bringing in weapons. Tactical units 
posted their own contraband lists in which they included items as 
various as automobiles and jewelcy, and the militacy government 
detachments acquired a new and, for the most part, unwelcome 
function as tactical commands and individual high-ranking 
officers requisitioned items of doubtful militacy usefulness through 
them. 
Munich MG assistant chief Keller was concerned about the 
plundering from the start, yet optimistic about stopping it. On May 1 he 
discussed with Cardinal Faulhaber the possibility of setting up a "mouse 
trap" for the plunderers; Keller planned to steer the plunderers away from 
the city by having ten train cars with wine, cheese, and other provisions 
waiting for them at the Ostbahnhof. 25 It is not certain whether this 
21wagner 151. 
22obermaier, and Mauerer 28. 
23ztemke, Army 136. 
24ziemke, Army 250-251. 
25obermaier, and Mauerer 150. 
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action was attempted. In any case, it was at that point an already futile 
maneuver. 
Munich MG did finally take a clear, demonstrative stand against 
the plundering. By May 18 MG had set up special raiding squads to 
constantly patrol and combat plundertng.26 MG assured the public that 
it would end all looting, and that plunderers would be punished sternly. 
MG guaranteed those small businessmen who were allowed to reopen 
that they could do so without having to fear looters.27 MG for Bavaria 
announced that all plundered goods were to be immediately collected and 
returned, and pledged the security of intact storehouses and supplies. 
MG ordered the establishment of the "Landesamtjiir Erniihrung und 
Landwirtschajt" (Land Office for Nutrition and Agriculture) to administer 
all remaining stocks --one of the first offices formed on the Land levei.28 
In the first months, US military courts determined punishment for 
the plunderers and other lawbreakers. Occupation directives had ordered 
the immediate closure of all courts: "extraordinary" courts and tribunals 
of the Nazi party as well as all ordinary criminal, civil and administrative 
26BayHStA OMGB(Y)l0/85-3/5, Weekly MG Munich, May 13-20, 
1945: "In conjunction with the civilian police, an American riot squad .. 
. . is operating efficiently in the suppression of riots, looting, black 
marked activities and petty crime;" Bay. Landeszeitung, May 18, 1945, 1; 
Chronik 51. Accordiing to Obermaier, and Mauerer (47), these teams of 
military police usually took along a local German policeman; this 
conferred some integrity to the German police who would later be on 
their own. 
27Bay. Landeszeitung, May 18, 1945, 1. 
28Bay. Landeszeitung, June 1, 1945, 2. 
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courts.29 By October 1945 MG developed a plan for the establishment of 
German courts. Under strict MG supervision the German courts 
gradually began to take on "milder" cases, and cases involving Germans 
breaking German laws.30 The Allies abolished all German criminal laws 
originating in the Third Reich, and reestablished those in effect until 
1924.31 This created two systems of justice in the first years of the 
occupation·, in which political cases and those involving the pillaging of 
US militruy property remained the domain of military courts. 32 
US occupation courts were responsible for criminal and civil 
matters, but criminal cases played a much greater role. MG criminal 
courts decided cases punishable by both American and applicable 
German laws.33 Foreigners and DPs breaking German laws were tried by 
29From JCS 1067 in Holborn 162. Apart from Nazi courts there 
were hardly any functioning courts by the end of the war (Robert M. W. 
Kempner, "Amerikanische Militargerichte in Deutschland," Die Freiheit 
des Anderen, [Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlags-Gesellschaft, 1981] 146). 
30suddeutsche, Nov. 6, 1945, 3. 
31 Miinchner, Aug. 11, 1945, 3. On German criminal law and Allied 
policy, see: Hans Theodor Schmidt, "Das Strafrecht in Deutschland nach 
der Kapitulation," Deutschland Archiv, 4 (1971): 43-47; Karl 
Loewenstein, "Justice," Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1953) 236-262. 
32Kempner 146. By 1946 the number of cases handled by American 
courts fell to 27.5%, by 1947 15.9% (146). 
33Kempner 146. Military Court procedures were unique for German 
defendants. In contrast to German law, the Anglo-American legal 
principles of "innocent until proven guilty" and Habeas Corpus were 
acknowledged (146). 
the MG courts. MG judges had the power to hand out the death 
sentence. 34 
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The courts were busy. By August 11, 1945, MG courts had tried 
15,000 cases since the occupation began.35 During the week of August 9-
15, 1945, for example, MG courts in Munich decided 193 cases. Most of 
these involved black market dealings, illegal possession of US Army 
goods, and false entries in the denazification questionnaires 
(Fragebogen).36 In Munich, MG summary courts handling the lesser 
cases-- breaking curfew, trespassing, for instance-- were trying 70 cases 
daily in November 1945, and had already sentenced 4,000 people.37 
A series of MG proclamations warned potential lawbreakers. MG 
measures were designed not only to impede the possibility of disorder, 
but also to assure the population that the situation was firmly under 
MG control. Weapons or munitions in the hands of civilians, of any 
nationality, were strictly forbidden and severely punished. Civilians with 
knowledge of such items were to immediately report to MG posts or 
Munich police stations.38 This policy was soon modified. As punishment 
MG proclaimed the possibility of a death sentence, but at the same time 
an amnesty period went into effect: anyone handing over munitions 
34-suddeutsche, Nov. 27, 1945, 3. 
35Munchner, Aug. 11, 1945, 4. 
36Munchner, Sept. 1, 1945, 2. 
37suddeutsche, Nov. 27, 1945, 3. 
38Miinchner, June 9, 1945, 2. 
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between July 9 and July 15 was free from punishment.39 The Miinchner 
Zeitung demonstrated MG decisiveness by disclosing the fate of 
lawbreakers such as Georg Fehlmer from Laufen: the highest military 
court in Munich sentenced Herm Fehlmer to 15 years in prison for the 
illegal possession of fire arms and munitions. Fehlmer had been 
hoarding the material, then burying or hiding it near his home.40 
From the day the occupation began the theft of US militacy 
property was an issue. Daily MG received reports of civilians caught 
stealing militacy goods. MG warned that anyone in possession of Allied 
property would be harshly punished. MG did not acknowledge the 
common excuse that it was not clear to the new owner that the stolen 
articles were Allied property; nor did MG recognize the excuse that the 
property was not under guard and therefore assumed to be "at hand."41 
On May 17, two Miinchner were sentenced to two years in prison for 
stealing tools belonging to the US Army. 42 MG considered the situation 
severe enough that in Januacy 1946 it secured the authority to employ 
and arm German guards to protect militaty installations as well as 
targets "merely of importance to the civilian economy. n43 
39Munchner, July 14, 1945, 2. 
4~unchner, July 14, 1945, 2 .. 
41Bay. Landeszeitung, June 1, 1945, 2. 
42Bay. Landeszeitung, May 25, 1945, 2 
43BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR, 8. This directive of 
Jan. 14·, 1946 (BayHStA OMGB[Y] 9/18-1 I 4) was valid for the whole US 
Zone. The guards were to be "selected, employed, trained, supervised, 
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MG established a form of martial law that allowed US and US-
sponsored authorities almost unlimited powers. In the chaos of the first 
months, however, even MG hegemony could be exploited, and the 
confusion of citizens manipulated. The massive movements of desperate, 
needy people in this period lent itself to many criminal schemes, and 
continued for quite some time. In September of 1945, MG observed the 
following ruse:44 
Masquerading in parts of cast-offWehrmacht uniforms and 
pretending to be discharged PW's returning from the Russian 
occupied zone or simply posing as refugees haVing been mistreated 
by Russian occupational troops, numerous beggars are making 
their appearance in certain sections of Munich, especially in the 
less destroyed Western suburbs and in the surrounding country. 
They are taking advantage of the credulity of the populace in 
general. 
After the plundering became too risky, clever opportunists contrived 
simple, effective, and more "refined" methods for seizing goods. Small 
gangs of men, for instance, donned American uniforms, or uniforms 
similar enough to deceive. They approached residences and brusquely 
announced themselves, presumably, "on orders of Military Government," 
or members of an authorized "anti-Nazi organization," and proceeded to 
search the home and "confiscate" whatever they wished.45 The 
acknowledged respect for uniforms also led shrewd criminals to feign 
disciplined and controlled by the head of the police force .... in 
accordance with local policy ( 1 ). " In addition, MG was authorized to 
license private detective agencies and guard services that passed 
denazification directives. These men were not to be armed, not even with 
batons (2). 
44BayHStA OMGB(Y) CO I 445 I 1, Untitled MG Report (hereafter: 
MG Report) for Sept. 28 to Oct. 4, 1945. 
45obermaier, and Mauerer 4 7. 
themselves as German police. By July 1946 120 "phony" detectives had 
been caught since the beginning of the year.46 
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Many "infringements" were customary for such a chaotic, desperate 
atmosphere. Other circumstances were more vicious. In the war years of 
1939-45 there were 100 registered violent deaths in all of Upper Bavaria 
(Oberbayem). In Munich alone between May 1 and July 28, 1945, 
however, roughly 421 people died a violent death-- 155 from murder or 
beatings, 63 by suicide, and 120 from accidents.47 Among these deaths--
registered to the Munich police-- 302 were men, 84 women, and 35 
children. A further 83 persons were victims of SS or Wehrmacht military 
courts, and 95 reported missing-- among these 28 children.48 
In Bavaria as a whole, the most vicious crimes decreased after 
roughly the first three months. Nevertheless, "lesser" crimes such as 
robbery, looting, and common assault continued and even increased.49 
The number of such crimes was already high: in the months of May and 
June, for example, 6,048 burglaries and 1,334 robberies, muggings, and 
lootings50 were reported to the largely helpless and understaffed Munich 
police. MG Public Safety for Bavaria found that there had been an 
46chronik 180. 
47wagner 167. 
48obermaier, and Mauerer 54. 
49BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, Public Safety Branch Monthly 
Report (hereafter PSBMR), Nov. 5, 1945, 1. 
50obermaier, and Mauerer 54. It is important to bear in mind that 
many lesser crimes were presumably never reported. 
increase of crimes committed by US Army personnel as well; crimes 
extending from "the theft of bicycles and radios to rape and felonious 
assault."51 
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The "lesser" crimes did not dissappear over time. In 1947 Public 
Safety for Bavaria concluded that "arson, sex offences, narcotic offences, 
black market, abortion, offences against Military Government laws, 
fraud, theft, coinage crimes and stolen property" had all increased over 
the year before. 52 Public Safety crime statistics reveal that the total 
crimes committed in the year 1946-4 7 -- 410,225 -- were almost twice as 
many as in the year 1945-46 -- 284,666.53 
In the short term, Public Safety for Bavaria concluded (in Nov. 
1945) that the main deterrent to the more violent crimes was the arming 
of the local police: the number of incidents dropped in those areas where · 
police were armed. Furthermore, as local police gained greater mobility --
by means of patrol cars, motorcycles, and so forth-- crimes also 
decreased. 54 Munich MG's Public Safety also stressed the importance of 
arms and equipment. Moreover, reports attributed many early problems 
to "all sorts of vagabonds and generally unclassiflable persons" who 
51BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBMR, Nov. 5,1945, 1. MG's 
conclusion was based on reports from German government officials (1). 
See also: Zink 137-138. 
52BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, Public Safety Branch Cumulative 
Annual History (hereafter PSBCAH), July 16, 1947, 7. 
53 
53BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBCAH, July 16, 1947,7. 
54BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBMR, Nov. 5, 1945, 1. 
became reasonably assimilated by the end of the third month of 
occupation.55 
DISPLACED PERSONS AND CRIME 
Much of the criminal disorder sprang from a somewhat unlikely 
source. Among the unfortunate multitude of the so-called Displaced 
Persons (DPs) were individuals accountable for many sorts of crime. 56 
DP criminals included former forced laborers as well as former 
96 
concentration camp inmates. DP status was peculiar, and posed special 
problems for MG as well as the German authorities.57 
In 1944-45, the Allies invented the term "Displaced Persons" to 
describe all those individuals who, because of Nazi persecution and labor 
policies, were in a place they did not belong. These groups required and 
deserved fun dam en tal assistance from Allied authorities as victims of the 
Nazi regime. 58 
55BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR 7-9. 
56 Another social group, youth, showed a marked, though not as 
large part in crime activities as DPs in the post-war period. Youth crime 
began to increase in 1946 (Chronik 146). On causes, see Barbara 
Willenbacher, "Zerriittung und Bewahrung der Nachkriegs-Familie," Von 
Stalingrad zur Wahrungreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in 
Deutschland, Ed. Martin Brozsat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans · 
Woller, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988) 596-618. 
57The DPs should not be confused with the refugees -- mostly 
German nationals-- flooding into Germany during this period from the 
east. 
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The DPs constituted a definable group, but structurally they were 
an "amorphous" one of individuals transferred and imprisoned against 
their will. Within the category of DPs were two types: on the one hand 
forced laborers and foreign workers; on the other liberated persecutees59 
-- political prisoners, concentration camp victims, and so forth. One 
relatively homogenous DP characteristic-- age-- was precisly due to the 
fact that many DPs were forced laborers selected for youth and stability. 
DPs constituted a rather solid age group instead of a normal mix of ages 
between various sociallevels60 Precise, contemporary age figures for 1945 
are nevertheless difficult to ascertain for DPs as a whole. Rough 
estimates of Polish DPs suggest that there were more male than female 
DPs; that the men were mostly between 15 and 35, and the women 
between 25 and 39.61 
The Allied Powers naturally assumed the enormous responsibility 
of caring for and repatriating the DPs. Still, who exactly was in charge of 
this reponsibility had to be clarified during 1945. According to the UN 
charter of Nov. 9, 1943, the DPs were displaced nationals of the United 
58wolfgang Jacobmeyer, "Die Displaced Persons," Fliichtlinge und 
Vertriebene in der Westdeutschen Nachkrtegsgeshcichte: Bilanzierung der 
Forschung und Perspektlven fiir die kiinftige Forschungsarbelt, Ed. 
Rainer Schulze, Doris von der Brelie-LeWien, and Helga Grebing, 
(Hildesheim: Lax, 1987) 175. In this piece Jacobmeyer indicates the lack 




61Jacobmeyer 176. Jacobmeyer (176) attributes the higher female 
age to "rational'' Nazi criteria for forced labor: older female laborers were 
less inclined to become pregnant. 
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Nations.62 Accordingly, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA) was to care for DPs in Germany and attend to 
their repatriation after the capitulation. Initially, however, UNRRA 
personnel assisted the Allied armies in DP matters. UNRRA teams were 
under the command of Allied Supreme Commander General Eisenhower, 
and the US Army assumed supply responsibilities for DPs in Germany.63 
Originally, MG personnel were only to care for and locate DPs 
during the combat period. The administration of DP assembly centers in 
the rear zones was to be gradually taken over by UNRRA personnel ready 
for special assistance. Nevertheless, the surrender in May suddenly 
liberated MG administrative staff as well as Allied transport and care 
capacity for DP matters.64 At the time of the surrender there were an 
estimated 5,800,000 DPs in the occupation areas as a whole. 3,260,000 
of these were repatriated by July 2, 1945.65 In summer and fa111945 a 
daily rate of 33,000 DPs were transported to their homes. By 1946 
repatriation slowed down tremendously, and for the whole year reached 
only about 500,000 DPs.66 In the American Zone itself, the total number 
62Holborn 13. 
63Holborn 13. The three volume UNRRA histo:ry gives only scant 
mention of UNRRA and the DP issue within Germany: UNRRA: The 
History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 
Ed. George Woodbridge, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1950). 
64Holbom 48. 
65Munchner, July 14, 1945, 1. 
66Jacobmeyer 177. 
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ofDPs in UNRRA assembly centers in May 1946 was down to 348,000 --
163,000 Poles, 87,000 Balkans, 43,000 Jews and 55,000 of various 
origm.67 
The German-American historian Hajo Holborn gives MG credit for 
solving much of the early DP repatriation problem. Since events 
developed vecy quickly after May, the UNRRA teams became a factor in 
DP matters much later than planned.68 How soon the DPs would be 
turned over to the civilian UNRRA authorities was left up to the 
individual MG commanders in the field. In the confusing period at the 
end of hostilities, when MG found itself responsible for many challenging 
tasks at once, this meant that the turnover of DPs to UNRRA varied 
greatly.69 
In May 1945 Munich MG staff and tactical army DP teams had full 
responsibility for DP care and repatriation. At that time there were than 
300 camps or "concentrations" of DPs in the Munich area. Four of the 
largest camps consisted of 7,000; 6,500; 4,000; and 1,000 respectively. It 
is difficult to establish the exact number of DPs at a given time, since 
repatriation proceeded at such a rapid rate during this time. 
Nevertheless, MG estimated the total amount of DPs to be about 
65,000.70 The following list from MG reports details the various 








































As the numbers illustrate, most of the DPs from Western European 
countries were readily repatriated in the first months. Russian DPs, 
although numerous, were promptly transported home as well. Already by 
the middle of June, MG reported an insufficient number of Russian DPs 
to complete the "rail quota" of 2,000 persons. In the last week of June, 
however, there was an "unprecedented influx" of Russians from other 
sites in the American Zone that "taxed DP camp facilities to the limit." 
Still, this was temporacy, as Munich was a necessacy railhead: in one 
telling example more than 30,000 Russians were sent on within 24 hours 
70BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 149. 
71BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR 150. 
72BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 150. 
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after their arrival. 73 By July the number of DP camps had been reduced 
to 200.74 By Sept. 1945 the DP population totalled 29,389.75 
The job of caring for the DPs put a great burden on MG. Principal 
difficulties were locating housing and providing food. MG attempted to 
assemble DPs in the largest concentrations possible to simplify 
administration, attain more effective security, and to assure economy in 
food distribution. 76 
Continuous reorganization in 1945 caused shifts and a lack of 
clarity in responsibility for the DPs. The regular US Army relieved the 
Munich MG detachment of some DP responsibilites by the end of July.77 
After October 1945 UNRRA took over the administration and care for the 
DP camps. 78 Complete termination of MG responsibility for DP matters 
was made official on December 31, 1945. Nevertheless, Munich MG felt it 
necessary, "temporarily at least," to maintain a DP bureau, since the 
Munich Rathaus where MG was headquartered was "an obvious focal 
73BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR 153. 
74Munchner, July 7, 1945, 2. 
75BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR 153. 
76BayHStAOMGB(Y} 10/78-1/4, MunichAHR 150. 
77BayHStA OMGB(Y},10/78-l /4, Munich AHR 153. On the regular 
army's role in DP matters, see: Ziemke, Army 284-290. 
78wetzel 346. In Munich UNRRA established a headquarters for 
the complete US Zone, and in the Deutsches Museum a university for DPs 
(346}. 
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point" which DP's sought out for advice, assistance, and information. 79 
A visiting MG observer lamented in December 1945 the lack of 
"centralized control" between the various branches and agencies 
responsible for DP affairs, a tense situation that was straining the efforts 
of MG detachment staff burdened with an increased work load despite 
fewer personnel. 80 
Allied leaders had hoped to resolve problems of DP care and 
repatriation by September of 1945.81 The UNRRA and MG personnel 
managing DP matters were soon faced with problems of a different and 
more complex nature, however. Many DPs viewed the regimented 
"administration" of their lives and their condition -- despite the clear 
advantages in comparison to life in the Third Reich -- as continuation of 
their former persecution and severe existence.82 Some DPs remaining 
after the first couple of months did not want to comply with 
repatriation, 83 and avoided returning to their former homes. Polish DPs 
posed a special challenge in this respect. Of these former civilian forced 
laborers and soldiers, more than 500,000 remained in the British and 
American Zones as of the end of August. Many refused to be repatriated, 
and held out for transport to other destinations and new homes.84 
29. 
79BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/3, MG Monthly for January, 1946, 
80BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 5-6. 




Inside the camps some DP groups began to defiantly organize themselves 
both politically and militarily, forcing US occupation forces to take 
drastic actions. 85 
The greatest dilemma for occupation and German authorities was 
the DPs' involvement in crime. Not all, or even most of the DPs were 
criminal. It is nevertheless a fact that in Munich and throughout the US 
Zone DPs played a significant role in criminal activities. 86 It is 
impossible to establish the exact impetus for DP criminality, but many 
motives can be presumed: hate, fear, revenge, hunger-- all stemming for 
years of deprivation and brutality; the frustrating idleness of the DP 
camps; in addition perhaps an expectation among some -- consciously or 
not -- that they would be able to utilize their liberated status for 
unworthy ends. 
Among the DPs remaining after the first few months of 
repatriations were many doubtful characters. In a telling example, MG in 
nearby Regensburg had 240 DPs complete a questionnaire similar to the 
Fragebogen required of Germans. Results revealed that 40 percent of 
84Miinchner, Sept. 1, 1945, 3. This Polish problem was significant 
enough that General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomecy felt it 
necessacy to hold talks on it at the end of Aug. 1945 (3). 
85For example: In Munich on Februacy 14, 1946, heaVily armed US 
tactical troops raided specific camps for Polish and YugoslaVian DPs. The 
units seized numerous documents and weapons, and in the YugoslaVian 
camp found that many DPs bore identification cards for the "Royal 
YugoslaVian Army of Bavaria" (Chronik 141). 
86For general consideration of the DPs and crime, see: Ziemke, 
Army 354-358. 
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those questioned, if German, would have been deemed "unemployable in 
responsible positions and possibly subject to arrest. "87 
MG reports are filled With obseiVations on lawless DPs. MG for 
Munich summarized the issue with the following passage:88 "The 
greatest problem in the early days [of the occupation] was the vast 
number ofDP's [sic], newly liberated persecutees, and criminals who had 
been indiscriminately released along With the political persecu tees, all of 
whom roamed the land and ravaged the towns." 
German officials came to the same conclusions. The criminal 
investigations branch of the Munich police recorded the following crimes 


















Figures for 1946 reveal that the percentage of foreigners committing the 
most vicious crimes (murder, robbecy, extortion) remained over 70%,90 
despite the diminishing number of DPs. 
DPs were responsible for many of the early, more vicious crimes, 
and were at the "vanguard" during the early plundering. Prominent 
87ziemke, Army 356. 
88BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 5. 
89wacker 55. It is unfortunate that these crime figures do not 
clarify which sort of the various DPs were most criminally active. 
90wacker 55. 
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among criminal DPs were the Poles. In Nov. 1945, MG's Public Safety 
Branch for Bavaria explained the crimes of the previous month in the 
following terms: "The bulk of [the] crimes were attributed to Displaced 
Persons [sic}, particularly Poles and Hungarians .... the incidence was 
heaviest in areas adjacent to Displaced Persons camps.91 
DPs remained criminally active for a long time. By Februazy 1946 
MG judgment of DP activity was much the same, in spite of repatriation 
efforts:92 
The looting and plundering reports attributed much of such 
activities to Displaced Persons. Information received indicated that 
the bulk of the persons, so engaged, have either refused to return 
to their native land or have been repatriated and have returned. 
Already by Sept. 1945, Munich MG had reached the following 
conclusion:93 
DP's remained the major offenders in all crimes, 46% of all arrests 
made in the last week were established as DP's and it is estimated 
that 90% of all major crimes were committed by them. 
In explaining a rising rate of crime incidences in 1946, Munich MG 
maintained that criminality was "largely due to the activities of DP's and 
other foreigners lodged in camps and lagers [sic]."94 In clarifying the 
main offenders, MG contended that ••the Poles continued to constitute 
the largest class of DP offenders."95 
91BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBMR, Nov. 5, 1945, 1. 
92BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBMR, Feb. 8, 1946,2. 
93BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR, 49. 
94BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR, 9. 
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Control of DP criminality was complicated by special problems. The 
use of American uniforms or similar dress allowed criminals to easily and 
often exploit the almost unlimited power of US occupation forces. In 
October 1945, MG and the German police found themselves constantly 
occupied with the following sort of situation: "DP's dressed in American 
uniform, continued their daily terror prowls, robbing and looting. One 
gang was broken up, the ring leader in jail, and an intensive 
investigation was made by the MP's and German Police. "96 It is not 
clear in all cases if MG or army personnel -- presumably when they 
staffed DP camps-- originally provided the uniforms. 
In any event, MG was concerned about the uniforms for another 
reason: reports of many crimes by DPs in American uniform were charged 
to the US troops. 97 Such circumstances certainly did not lend 
themselves to a greater trust of MG among the local population. By 
November Munich MG began an "aggressive campaign" to limit 
unauthorized persons from wearing US uniforms, and found the measure 
effective. 98 
To some degree the occupiers' experiments in security invited such 
consequences. A common practice was employing DPs as guards, 
especially Poles. In Munich, the units appear to have been much too 
95BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10178-114, Munich AHR, 52 . 
. 96BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10178-114, Munich AHR 50. 
97BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10 I 78-l I 4, Munich AHR 49. 
98BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10 I 78-l I 4, Munich AHR 51: "Offenders were 
stripped of the uniform and received jail sentences." 
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eager for MG standards: "A high degree of violence is exhibited by Poles 
employed by the US Army as guards."99 In January 1946, the Polish 
guards remained the "most troublesome group." They were still in 
American uniform, by then modified by only a small shoulder patch.1 00 
Significantly, even by March 1946 the problem had not been rectified:101 
The principal obstacle to efficient policing continued to be the 
Polish units wearing American uniforms. Until this situation is 
corrected confusion will exist as certain of these persons misuse 
the immunity of the uniform for their criminal purposes. 
Despite stricter MG measures, DP criminality was a problem that 
would not go away. In Bavaria between June 1 and October 30, MG 
courts (solely responsible for prosecuting DPs) held 2, 700 trials for 
serious crimes such as murder, robbecy and looting.1 02 MG courts 
pronounced harsh sentences. In December 1945, for example, the highest 
US military court in Munich sentenced two Greeks to death. On July 11 
. they had intentionally strangled a 62-year-old Munich woman and 
pillaged her apartment.l03 By November 1945, Public Safety for Bavaria 
felt the problems significant enought to receive authorization to use US 
Army personnel as armed guards at specific DP camps, especially in areas 
where crimes of looting, rape and murdering were widespread.! 04 In the 
99BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 9. 
lOOBayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 51. 
101BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 52. 
102ztemke, Army 358. 
103suddeutsche, December 7, 1945, 3. 
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same period, Munich MG assessed the DP situation in a familiar manner 
but offered an insightful View: 105 
Forty-two percent of the crime in Munich is caused by non-
Germans, who constitute less than 5% of the total population. 
Gangs of Frenchmen have been involved in the forging of food 
requisitions. Poles have been going to Poland, selling clothing 
issued here, and returning to Munich with huge sums in marks, 
and the hope of obtaining a new clothing hand-out. It has been 
recommended to higher authority, in View of the above reported 
incidents, that the non-Germans privilege of trial only by Militacy 
Government courts be withdrawn, or the policy of developing 
German responsibility for self-government will be undermined. 
The above recommendation remained a recommendation. 
DP criminals were a defiant and especially violent group. This 
factor made their arrest much more difficult, especially for German police 
who were relatively impotent in DP matters. Despite MG regulations, DPs 
were often armed and did not willingly yield to arrest. Because of this, 
MG assessed that the already high amount of crime reported did not 
reflect the "true picture" of crime. 106 
It is significant that not all former concentration camp inmates 
were law-abiding. Some DPs who were former prisoners of concentration 
camps -- although themselves victims of vicious brutality -- took part in 
robberies, plundering, and the black market. Many of these types took it 
upon themselves to exploit MG power and the helplessness of the 
occupied by illegally seizing goods and occupying housing. Some of the 
alleged victims had not been in concentration camps at at all; some were 
104sayHStA OMGB(Y) 10165-1/5, PSBMR, Nov. 29, 1945,2. 
I 05sayHStA OMGB(Y} I 0 I 78-l I 3, MG Monthly for November 
1945, 5. 
106sayHStA OMGB(Y) I0178-1 14, Munich AHR 51. 
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common criminals and murderers who were liberated along With the Jews 
and political prisoners. Others had served in the camps as henchmen · 
and "agent provocateurs" for the ss.1 07 
There was confusion and fear among the local population 
concerning which DPs had been politically persecuted, who of these were 
authorized by MG, and how effectively DPs were being controlled. The 
tense situation led to new measures. By September MG ordered the 
preparation of official identification cards for former concentration camp 
inmates that distinguished those who had been truly persecuted on 
political grounds from those criminal elements exploiting former camp 
inmate legitimacy.108 At the same time, MG used its media to warn the 
public of "Two Types of Camp Inmates" ("Zwei Arten von KZ'Lern")l 09 and 
clarified who was to be trusted in strict occupation matters and 
measures. 
Persistent pessimistic gossip clouded clear impressions of actual 
success in regulating concentration camp inmates. Rumors ran rampant 
among local Germans in November that MG would tolerate former forced 
laborers and concentration camp inmates unleashing a wave of 
plundering and looting around November 8 and 9, on the anniversary of 
the 1938 ~'Krystallnacht" (Ccystal Night). The rumors were without 
107Munchner, Sept. 8, 1945, 4. 
108chronik, 84; Miinchner, Sept. 8, 1945, 4. 
109Munchner, Sept. 8, 1945, 4. 
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foundation, yet MG, the German police, and a group of former camp 
inmates all clarified publicly they would not permit such activities. 110 
Many of the crime problems in the early occupation were direct 
products of brutal strife. Hideous strains on human dignity, morals and 
willpower ensued from the unforgiving devastation and utter breakdown 
of administration and infrastructure . The melee of crimes expressed 
hate, revenge, naked fear and cold opportunism. Under the 
circumstances, it could easily be argued, MG performed an admirable job 
in holding the possibility for crimes in check. Still, as the example of the 
looting situation in Munich reveals, MG appeared to act selectively early 
on in curbing certain threats to law and order. 
Tentative, unclear policy led to the DPs' ill-defined status and 
confused control. Many DPs, once victims themselves, fended for 
themselves or were assembled in camps at least symbolically similar to 
ones in which they languished for years. For many DPs the pain and 
want continued unabated after liberation, matched only by their 
newfound capacity to lash out and practice blunt malevolence at a 
savage world. Such ferocity of temper created major challenges for 
occupation authorities and near hopelessness for restrained German 
police officials. 
110BayHStAOMGB(Y) 10/65-1/5, PSBMR, Nov. 29, 1945, 1; 
Chronik 98. 
CHAPTER VI 
LAW AND ORDER ISSUES II: THE BLACK MARKET 
In the early post-war black market, significant elements thus far 
described in this study were present: MG's commanding role; uncertain 
German police authority; the effect of the plundering; crime and the DPs. 
The black market was a peculiar type of crime. The black market 
was an ironic "institution" that began to expand during the war and 
easily survived Nazi measures to tame it. Black marketeers mocked their 
persecutors and persisted to thrive into the chaotic early occupation and 
on. One could argue whether or not, under the circumstances, black 
market dealing was really a "crime" at all. Black marketing permeated all 
sectors of a bitterly ravaged society and involved Germans and Gis, MG 
officers and DPs alike. For many common, normally law-abiding citizens, 
the black market was the only way to survive. 
Black trading was a significant and threatening problem 
nevertheless. Unofficial trading interfered with official efforts to create an 
economic base and provide necessary levels of nutrition. Many black 
marketeers were heartless opportunists, some cruel and violent 
criminals. 
Efforts to curb the black market were mostly ineffectual or naively 
deemed successful. In combating the Munich black market, MG at first 
assumed the usual imposing role, but soon left most direct engagement 
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up to the German police. Did MG not recognize the intensity of the black 
market, or did it ignore the German police's inability to confront it? 
Perhaps MG did not consider itself ultimately responsible for the 
problem? The best explanation for this enigmatic issue appears to involve 
a combination of all these considerations, and more. 
THE NATURE OF THE BLACK MARKET 
To a great extent the black market resulted from the lack of 
sufficient provisions and goods, and did not begin at the capitulation. 
Throughout the Second World War there had existed in Europe a robust 
and consistent "shadow economy." In many cases the goal of this form of 
black marketeering was to evade Nazi economic controls 
(Zwangsbewirtschajtung) by circumventing rations restrictions. SS 
security officials described three rough criminal classifications of the 
wartime shadow economy: bartering (Tauschhandel); illicit trading 
(Schleichhandel); and black marketeering ( Schwarzhandel) .1 
Stern measures did not impede the growth of the black market 
inside the boundaries of the Third Reich. Stricter wartime controls only 
led to consistently rising economic "crimes." From 1939 to mid-1 943, 
59,253 violators were sentenced in the areas of the German Reich. The 
offences violated the War Economy Decree (Kriegswirtschajtsverordnung) 
of September 4, 1939, and the Consumption Control Criminal Ordinance 
(Verbrauchsregelungsstrajverordnung) of April 6, 1940. The number of 
1Boelke, Willi, Der Schwarzmarkt 1945-48: Vom Uberleben nach 
dem Kriege (Braunschweig: Westermann, 1986) 11-13. 
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offences jumped markedly after 1941; only 2,946 of the above cases were 
committed in 1939-40.2 
In the last years of the war, the shadow economy grew even more. 
Many of the simplest but necessacy household items could only be found 
on the black. market. The undeniable shadow economy led to the gradual 
legalization of lesser violations. Later Nazi economic decrees 
acknowledged the existence of a black market and toned down 
punishment for minor violations. 3 Guidelines for combatting bartering 
and illicit trading from August and December 1944 ignored the 
"Letztverbraucher" -- the ordinacy participant on the edges of the shadow 
economy-- as long he bought or traded for personal usage and "in 
modest amounts." Interestingly, the same decrees allowed foreign forced 
laborers -- the later DPs -- to trade inside their camps.4 
Despite the wartime growth of the black market, it is significant 
that, even under rationing, the levels of foodstuffs, consumer goods, and 
nutritrional standards had been largely assured. Significant amounts of 
goods arrived from the occupied lands to fill gaps. Increased bombings 
near the end of 1944 caused rationing to become more pronounced, yet 
the nutritional level for the "normal adult consumer" of 2,000 calories 




5Fuchs, Margot, "'Zucker, wer hat? 01, wer kauft?' Ernahrungslage 
und Schwarzmarkt in Miinchen 1945-49," Triimmerleben. Texte. 
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Unconditional surrender suddenly destroyed the ability to provide 
an adequate standard of goods and provisions. Chaos and destruction 
brought about the complete breakdown of the nutritional and supply 
infrastructure. The division of German areas, the loss of eastern lands 
and the devastation of the transport network compounded problems. The 
sudden lack of forced laborers in the agrarian economy posed another 
challenge.6 Plundering also took a great toll. In Munich, for instance, 
the pillaging of the first days emptied almost completely the provision 
stocks for the city. These supplies were intended to cover the population 
for several weeks. 7 
In matters regarding food supply, MG assumed a supervisory role 
from the beginning and appointed Germans to administer the situation. 
MG's response to the food emergency illustrates the early reliance on 
capable and effective figures. Munich MG immediately-- on May 5, 1945, 
days before MG controlled the widespread plundering-- appointed Dr. 
Ernst Rattenhuber to head the Landesamtfiir Ernahrung und 
Landwirtschajt (the Land Office for Nutrition and Agriculture). Like other 
early Munich appointees, Rattenhuber was made responsible for 
conditions in all of Bavaria. MG tnade it clear to Rattenhuber he was 
only a temporary "tool" (Werkzeug); MG pressured him to devise an 
Dokumente, Bilder aus den Miinchner Nachkriegsjahren, Ed. Friedrich 
Prinz and Marita Krauss, (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985) 




immediate solution to the food shortages. Rattenhuber was threatened 
with a war crimes indictment if he could not fulfill his task. 8 
Rattenhuber's assignment was daunting.9 Rattenhuber's office was 
to administer all the remaining stocks of goods and provisions. The office 
formulated a new rationing system which at first remained the same as 
before the surrender: Bavarians continued to use wartime ration cards 
(including the swastika printed on them) and obey the established 
distribution periods. Thereafter a monthly ration rate -- according to 
user categocy -- was set by the Wirtschajtsrat (Economic Council) 
su petvised by the Allies in Frankfurt. I 0 
The Wirtschajtrat's assigned goal of 2,600 calories for the average 
adult consumer was never reached in Munich. At the end of December, 
1945, the average was only 1,500 calories.ll Thus the nutritional and 
survival possiblities offered by the black market made it essential to 
many. The following examples are illustrative. In 1946, a common 
Munich pensioner recieved 45 marks a month. From this amount, he 
could purchase with a legal ration card whatever food was available for 
8Niethammer, "Besatzungsmacht," 177. Rattenhuber, a private 
land owner and monarchist, had administered the crown estates of the 
Bavarian princes. He had in1pressed MG by taking the initiative 
immediately before the occupation in attempting to secure the dai:ry 
supply in his own community ( 177 -78). 
9As it turned out, the politically problematic Rattenhuber -- he 
had Nazi as well as monarchist connections -- did not last in his post 




15 marks. Typical rent was 30 marks. His money now gone, he could not 
buy heating material legally or on the black market. A skilled worker with 
two children earned 200 marks a month. That amount covered dinner for 
one in a decent restaurant.12 In such an environment there were two 
realities, and two economies-- the legal and the black. 
Of course, the reasons for the black market were not simply 
nutritional. Any sort of trading outside the normal market, supply, and 
price structure was black market trading, and the ultimate effects of this 
total unofficial market were not positive. Illegal commerce did not 
necessarily help ease conditions. The buying and selling of items outside 
the rationing structure, for example, hindered supply efforts in the long 
run and undermined the price structure.13 
Many black marketeers were obviously not hying to survive, or help · 
people survive, but to prosper. Many of the criminals and plunderers 
discussed previously found the market a logical outlet, and the preferred 
arena. Accordingly, black market sources were manifold. German 
historian Willi Boelke has ascertained that the post-war black market 
derived merchandise from the following nine general sources:l4 1) 
supplies -- especially food and luxury items-- of the occupation forces; 
2) foreign products smuggled in; 3) assets of consumer goods and 
12chronik 212. 
13Fuchs 112. 
14Boelke 138 (translated by this author). The numerical sequence 
does not correspond to a quantative order; such a listing would be 
conjecture at best. 
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valuables from the German population; 4) routinely produced industrial 
and commercial goods; 5) normal agricultural production, surpluses, and 
unfulfilled delivecy quotas; 6) embezzled or squandered goods as well as 
leftover inventories from regular trade and commerce; 7) cached rations, 
bartered produce, and material assets; 8) belongings and provisions 
obtained by robbecy, theft, plundering and fraud; and 9) wares procured 
by counterfeiting (from falsified ration cards, for example). Black trade 
was "big business." At the end of 1946 roughly 30% of industrial 
production -- not including heavy industcy -- entered the black market 
directly .15 
Despite the severe consequences for possessing, selling, or trading 
US militacy property, the black market thrived from the availability of US 
goods. In September 1945, General Eisenhower found the situation 
extreme enough to fortify measures against the "dangerous" and growing 
trade in US goods, both for foreigners and German citizens. All civilians 
had to prove their rightful ownership of US property, and were threatened 
with the harshest punishment.16 
Many goods could simply not have reached the black market 
without the participation of the occupier. US soldiers as well as higher 
officers abused their powerful status17 and played a substantial role in 
15Fuchs 113. 
16Munchner, Sept. 22, 1945. 
17see: Davis 148-161. For depiction of an exceptionally corrupt--
politically and criminally-- MG detachment commander who went largely 
undiscovered, see the example of Eichsta.tt's Maj. Towle in Peterson 306-
314. 
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the black market, utilizing their impunity from the German police and 
creating the widespread availability of US goods and vehicles. Faced with 
dull occupation routine, Gls and officers found the black market was the 
only real game to play; "virtually evecy occupation soldier was faced with 
the maximum of opportunity and the maximum oftemptation."18 
Although most Americans denied it, black marketing was so widespread 
on a small scale that those who did not practice it were viewed as 
"peculiar' or 'freaks."' 19 Far less prevalent but a problem nevertheless 
were major black market rings involving higher ranking officers and G Is 
alike.20 The bribecy of US personnel was also widespread, and some 
German employees of MG exploited their influence in return for certain 
favors.21 The endless cases reported in MG media served as a warning,22 
but also hint at all the corruption that was never discovered. 
Considerable US militacy involvement in the black market 
continued until the currency reform of 1948 despite continual 




21various examples in Siiddeutsche, Oct. 23, 1945, 4. 
22For example, the case of Hans Klein: Klein was found guilty of 
attempting -- with the help of a German ·employee of MG -- to bribe a US 
militacy criminal court officer into freeing his father, a restaurant owner 
arrested for the illegal posession of large stocks of US cigarettes and 
provisions stored in his restaurant (Siiddeutsche, Oct. 12, 1945, 3). 
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and finances. Occupation chroniclers such as Harold Zink maintain that 
the Americans' widespread black marketing had an even greater impact 
on the occupation than simply economic or operational factors.24 Many 
Germans became far less impressed with their occupiers' abilities, lofty 
aims and strict measures when they witnessed daily the widespread 
duplicity the Americans practiced by enjoying the sour fruits of the black 
market. 
Resolute black marketeers repeatedly adapted themselves to market 
conditions. Directly after the capitulation, money-- reichsmarks, 
militaty currency, and dollars-- played a major role on the black market. 
Money changing paid off, and goods brought enormous profits; prices 
were well over those in normal conditions. The amounts fluctuated 
greatly according to supply and demand.25 By the end of August 1945 
money was losing significance, however, and the cigarette was fast 
becoming the prime currency as well as the preferred product.26 
American cigarettes were highest in demand. Coffee also held steady 
worth.27 As in the Third Reich shadow economy, many items and 
services were simply bartered. The intrinsically unregulated and fluid 
23Davis ·151-161; Boelke 127-129. US soldiers found guilty of black 
market dealings could be immediately sent home (129) --perhaps 
another reason why so many were involved! 
24Davis 138. 
25Fuchs 113. 
26By the middle of August evety citizen of both sexes over 18 years 
of age received a regular ration of 20 cigarettes (Chronik 69). · 
27obermaier, and Maurer 72. 
nature of the black market made it extremely difficult to control or 
impede. 
CONFRONTING THE MUNICH BLACK MARKET 
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In Munich the already existing black market continued almost 
without pause after the capitulation at various sites. The Gestapo had 
indifferently monitored a black market among foreign forced labor in and 
around hospital facilities at the north end of the Sendlinger Tor-Platz. 
During May 1945, without police controls and little possibility of arrest, 
this area developed into a major black market center.28 Other black 
market areas suddenly emerged, including the Hauptbahnhqf (main train 
station). Pubs, restaurants and hotels began to attract black traders as 
well, especially in inclement weather.29 
At first the black marketeers appeared freely in the open. It is 
impossible to determine the degree to which the unchecked plundering 
contributed to the black marketeers' sudden confidence, but a 
connection is presumed. Moreover: the circumstance that many black 
marketeers were DPs who suddenly found themselves liberated and 
considered themselves relatively free from (especially German) control 
offers an explanation for the unexpected casualness. Another factor is 
that MG was only beginning to establish its authority in May. 
28obennaier, and Maurer, 46. 
29Fuchs 115. 
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In any case, the relative confusion afforded black traders much 
latitude. German laws regulating the black market remained in effect but 
appear to have held little actual sway over lawbreakers. In June 1945, 
the desolate Munich criminal police observed defiant black marketeers 
setting up umbrellas, laying out their wares, and conducting games of 
~hance offering huge money ptizes of bundled reichsmarks.30 
Not until June did MG or German authorities seriously attempt to 
address the situation. US personnel participated directly early on. They 
remained available for assistance if necessaty, yet in combatting the 
black market MG soon took on an "advisoty" role. Although issues 
remained which MG influenced directly, it soon left the routine control 
of the black market largely up to the police and the municipal 
authorities. 
Concerted efforts to combat the black market began in July 1945. 
MG determined that black market operators were indeed violating 
German criminal laws, and German police surveyed the extent, 
locations, sources and possible legal violations (both US and German) of 
black market activities. 31 Combined units (named "flying squads" by 
MG) of German and military police repeatedly raided black market areas. 
Munich's famous Viktualienmarkt, the site of a thriving black market, was 
raided hourly or m~re, so that soon MG could report "negative" black 
market activity. 32 The first black market case-- illegal possession of 
3DFuchs 113. 
31BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 46. 
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rationed German meat-- resulted in a guilty sentence and punishment 
of 1 year imprisonment including hard labor.33 By the end of July, 121 
persons had been arrested for black market crimes, and 162 
interrogated. 34 
The apparent mastecy of the situation continued. In August MG 
attributed success in fighting the black market to the following 
measures: "The dispersing of large gatherings .... the circulation of 
criminal police in civilian clothes wherever people gather . . . . the 
presence of cruising motorcycle patrols .... [and] the use of placards 
and a sound truck as warning device."35 Twelve squads of German police 
were patrolling during the day and an MG sound truck roamed the 
streets announcing warnings against black market activity. 36 
According to the its own reports Munich MG considered these 
efforts highly successsful. Already in mid-August reports claimed that 
"the backbone of the Black Market [sic] was broken," and attributed 
further success to the decrease in DPs, "offering proof that these people 
are the main violators of Price and Food Control Laws ... 37 By September 
MG reported firm control of the situation and that "[no 1 American goods 
32BayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/ 142--1/7, MG Weekly, July 3-20, 1945. 
33BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR, 46. In this period 
black market cases were handled by MG courts. 
34Boelke 223. 
35BayHStA OMGB(Y) 13/142-1/7, MG Weekly, Aug. 10-17, 1945. 
36BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 46. 
37BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 48. 
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were in evidence." October reports concluded that large-scale black 
market activity was over, although "the small peddler will continue to 
operate as long as there are controlled items." MG was certain that "the 
continued application of pressure" would prevent future black trade from 
"getting out of hand."38 As far as MG was concerned, the situation was 
under control, and subsequent reports give scant reference to any change 
in the black market situation. 
MG misjudged the strength of the black market. The black market 
was by no means under control in the fall of 1945, and the "operators" 
certainly not stagnant. Between September 1 and October 19, 1945, over 
650 black marketeers were apprehended and sentenced in Munich, 39 an 
average of 12-15 persons a day.40 This large figure also hints at the 
violators who were never caught. 
It was a "dubious" victory.41 Munich's black marketeers were 
remarkably tough, flexible, and determined, and quickly adapted to the 
situation.42 In reality, the black market had only been prodded from 
public view. Dealings began to take place more and more behind closed 
doors. Open-air locations remained for contact purposes; poten~ial 
38BayHStA OMGB(Y) 10/78-1/4, Munich AHR 49-50. 
39chronik, 92; Siiddeutsche, Oct. 19, 1945, 3. 
40suddeutsche, Oct. 19, 1945, 3. Of those 650 arrested, the 
youngest was 13, the oldest 72. The number of young people and women 




traders would meet to decide on the goods and the price, and then 
conduct the actual business in a safe place.43 Munich's huge beer halls 
were perfectly suited for completing or arranging transactions. Other 
methods soon caught on: clever traders had much success by reappearing 
immediately after a raid, and the defiant tactic became a common 
practice.44 Some black marketeers organized their own bicycle patrols to 
warn of impending raids. 45 MG officers were presumably aware of the 
dubious environment. A black market investigation in September 
revealed, for example, that "meat, vegetables, coffee, and cigarettes, are 
being sold by the house-to-house canvassing method."46 
The question remains whether MG really was concerned about, or 
considered itself responsible for taming the black market. Confident 
Munich MG soon left the task of combatting the black market to 
relatively independent German police units. In July, the Munich police --
in the midst of reorganization and working closely with US Military 
Police -- had started to act against illicit trading by ordering its 
somewhat unsure patrolmen to clear any public gathering in known 




46sayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, MG Report for Aug. 30 to Sept. 
6, 1945. 
4 7Boelke 94. On the Sendlinger Tor-Platz crowds seeking illegal 
trading opportunities reached from 800 to 1 ,500 persons. 
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police to set up a special branch (Sonderabteilung) for fighting the black 
market. This unit began on September 1 under the direction of the new 
Police Chief Pitzer. At first it was comprised of a meager 32 officials --for 
a city of over 560,000 registered citizens.48 
The special units contributed nevertheless to the apparent check 
on black market activity. Yet the ability of the Munich police to combat 
the black market was complicated by numerous dilemmas. Both the 
sheer numbers of black marketeers and their cleverness in finding new 
methods were difficult to control. MG restrained certain German 
proposals for fighting black trade. In late September, for example, a plan 
to declare it illegal, and punishable, for four or more persons to gather 
was rejected by MG.49 
German police au thortty enjoyed little respect. The following 
example serves as illustration. As early as July 19, 1945, a Munich police 
team -- 20 detectives and 25 patrolmen -- attempted a raid on the 
Viktualienmarkt. The raid was a disaster from the beginning. A large group 
of DPs approached the police vehicles before they even fully stopped, 
pulled policemen out and attacked them. The police, after rescuing a 
driver from the crowd and With a few suspects in custody, eventually fled 
the scene under a barrage of stones. The raid resulted in only six arrests 
and numerous wounded policemen. 50 




The policeman's truncheon proved scarcely effective against the 
more violent black marketeers. MG recognized this,51 but initially stuck 
to its policy of putting off rearming the police. MG Public Safety Branch 
officials blamed the German police for not handling the truncheon 
effectively52 and attempted to strengthen the black market units by 
calling for an increase in the number of personnel instead. Constant 
pressure from police chief Pitzer as well as the continuing incidents of 
police ineffectiveness eventually led MG to change its policy. 53 
DPs proved an impossible challenge to German police. DPs were 
commonly the most violent black marketeers, and also had the least 
regard for German authority. German police assumed that most of the 
main traders had established permanent inventories, and believed the DP 
camps a major source. 54 German officials had no jurisdiction over DPs, 
however, and could not enter their camps. This fact of life continued well 
past the first months. In describing the situation near the Deutsches 
Museum -- a prominant DP gathering spot and UNRRA camp -- the 
following Munich police report expresses the pronounced lack of 
leverage:55 





55Report from July 17, 1946 qtd. in Boelke 96 (this author's 
translation). 
127 
[DPs) believe that the German police are not allowed to intervene 
against them. When German police do take action against them, 
the DPs immedediately put up severe resistance, and do not back 
down. This is why inteiVention led to nasty incidents evecy day. 
Police were surrounded by packs, pelted with stones, and 
threatened to be thrown in the Isar [river]. When in an emergency 
policeman reach for the truncheon or the pistol, they are rudely 
insulted as "Nazi police." Even the threat of the pistol alone 
became impossible. When we attempted to check someone out for 
black market trading, hundreds of [DPs] came out of the UNRRA-
camp to back the suspect. Only in a few cases were German police 
able to complete arrest and bring a suspect to the station. The 
assistance of the milita:cy police brought little real improvement, so 
that since May 1946 German patrols have discontinued activity in 
the area. 
The inability of the German police to act in DP matters allowed the 
black market to flourish. The UNRRA camps, off limits to German police 
and due to a lack of personnel and authority out of the influence of MG, 
were a main source for this market. Relatively ample DP food rations 
frequently ended up as black market merchandise. A MG officer assigned 
to conduct a routine operations review of the Munich situation 
considered UNRRA. management ofDP food stocks "terrible:"56 
The food leakage from the warehouse at Munich distributing food 
to DP camps is uncontrollable at the present time. It is well known 
that this source constitutes the greatest black market activity and 
the UNRRA officials are entirely responsible 
The visiting officer regretted the fact that MG detachment personnel 
could not take a more active role in controlling the situation:57 
On account of redeployment it was necessa:cy to curtail [MG's] 
checking of UNRRA operations because the Det ["detachment"] did 
not have the personnel. It is not known what the percentage of 
rations overdrawn is, but it is recognized that the black market 
56BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 3. 
57BayHStA OMGB(Y) C0/445/ 1, Op. Report, Dec. 19, 1945, 3. 
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from this source is increasing and the Det has no additional officer 
personnel to assign this duty. 
The premature victory over the black market in the fall of 1945 was 
in reality the beginning of an increasingly worsening situation. This MG 
assessment of Janumy 1946 practically acknowledged as much:58 
There is still a Black Market in operation in Munich. It has, 
however, gone underground and D.P.'s [sic] are the main culprits. 
German police have no influence with these DPs, and consequently 
UNRRA has its own police force to deal with them. In the last week 
122 persons were arrested for Black Market, and 75 were D.P.s. 
These figures do not portray the true percentages of D.P's and 
Germans engaged in Black Market, however, as the German Police 
are not able to arrest most of the former. 
Huge black market raids increased. Over 125 were conducted in 1946, 
leading to 3,803 arrests. 59 Moreover, increasing crime rates necessitated 
concerted operations between MG, US military police and the German 
police. MG was forced to assist in problematic DP matters. On November 
10, 1946, for example, MG conducted a major raid at the DP camp on the 
Leonrodstrqfie. 100 arrests were made, and numerous stocks of munitions 
and provisions obtained from US Army depots, pillaged goods, and black 
market items were seized.60 
The black market dillemas of 1945 constituted only the start of a 
major problem. Intensified enforcement and more effective police tactics 
did not address the human issues at the heart of much black market 
activity. Social and psychological problems such as hunger, fear, ill 





regard and uncertainty would get much worse after 1945 before they 
improved. Only with the scant but promising optimism brought on by the 
Currency Reform of 1948 did the black market itself begin to wane. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
It is a wonder US MG detachments achieved what they did under 
the complex and chaotic conditions they faced in the spring, summer, 
and fall of 1945. US MG revealed a checkered ability to establish ·its own 
authority and control affairs, but in an important area like Munich 
completed its goals with admirable efficiency. As MG gave up the 
constant and direct control of German affairs early in the occupation, it 
could only accomplish a limited amount. German authorities still had a 
long stretch of hardship and growth before they reached effective 
credibility and capability. The first year of the occupation constituted a 
purposeful beginning, but a precarious one as well. 
The issues described in these pages were crucial, and greatly helped 
determine the course of the occupation and the directions of German 
postwar development. Formidable human suffering, supply concerns, 
infrastructure breakdown and the lack of credible German authority 
nagged at the efforts to begin anew. Fueled by anger, revenge, hunger, 
need and greed, threatening lawbreakers consistently challenged MG and 
German authorities' efforts to establish themselves. To a certain extent, 
only time could really heal many ·crtme problems. Such critical issues 
could only be solved by fundamental improvements in the post-war 
environment; by stabilization of the food supply, a stable currency, a 
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rejuvenated system and a hopeful populace. In 10 years' time from 1945, 
US occupation authorities would still be commonplace in Southern 
Bavaria, yet the sor:cy state of things was much transformed. The 
horrific, chaotic conditions could not last indefinitely. The effects would, 
however, last lifetimes. 
The period emphasized in this work constituted the "incubation 
stage" of postwar Germany. Modern Munich, Southern Bavaria, and all 
of Germany are today still vecy much direct progeny of those hard 
formative years. The aftermath of the century's most unforgiving war and 
the ensuing occupation led to results that were mostly new for Germans, 
in some aspects continuous With the pre-Nazi past, and in others 
remarkably akin to issues today. The German press has regained its 
identity, but that identity is today much closer to the Anglo-Saxon 
model than it was before the war. Modern German police do not still 
dress like Chicago policemen, nor are they directly responsible to their 
municipality as US planners intended them to be. Yet they do serve the 
citizens and they uphold their constitution, the Grundgesetz. Providing 
for masses of once enslaved Displaced Persons is no more a problem in 
Germany-- or is it? Despite recent laws, German officials and politicians 
grapple daily With a constant influx of refugees and asylum-seeking 
aliens. The sudden economic prosperity of the 1950s' Wirtschajtswunder 
dealt the final blow to many of the economic and social problems caused 
by the war and during the occupation period -- or did it? The examples, 
comparisons and questions go on ad infinitum, but the source is the 
same; the process was defined in the chaotic early months of the US 
occupation. 
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In this "incubation stage" of the occupation the United States 
assumed the role of conqueror and was soon forced to grow into an 
international master. In assuring law and order, US officials were forced 
for the first time to fully assume the "world's policemen" role they are 
recognized for today. US Militacy Government experiences such as those 
detailed in these pages provided significant lessons for the new role. 
These considerations bring us back to the introduction of this 
work, and what this thesis was meant to achieve. I sought to illustrate 
how US Militacy Government established authority and directed law and 
order in a given area, and determine the challenges involved. This work 
does not attempt to be the last word on this subject, but rather attempts 
to raise and define valid questions about it. Many researchable issues are 
raised in these pages, but the method of managing them is also an issue. 
This study puts them on the table. As it turned out, there were many 
challenges in attempting to document such a confused and volatile 
period and subject. Hopefully the effort offers some rewards in return. 
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